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SUMMARY 
One of the objectives of the Securities Regulation Code on Takeovers and Mergers ("the 
Code") was to achieve neutrality of treatment of minority shareholders in takeover situations 
irrespective of the method employed to effect the takeover. This objective has not yet been 
achieved despite the inclusion of Rule 29 in the Code. Different levels of minority protection 
apply depending on the method used to effect a takeover. Asset takeovers are also 
excluded from the ambit of the Code. It is suggested that capital reductions and security 
conversions be prohibited to effect a takeover unless the Code is applicable to the 
transaction. The scheme of arrangement procedure, with certain suggested amendments, 
should be retained as a takeover method. It is further suggested that section 228 of the 
Companies Act be amended to ensure greater minority shareholder protection but that 
asset takeovers not be included within the ambit of the Code at this stage. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The introduction of the Securities Regulation Code on Takeovers and Mergers ("the 
Code") 1 has had a profound impact on the South African law relating to the 
acquisition of securities. The stated objective of the Code, as laid down and applied 
by the Securities Relation Panel ("the Panel"), is to operate principally to ensure fair 
and equal treatment of all holders of relevant securities in relation to "affected 
transactions". The concept of "affected transactions" will be dealt with in due course, 
but, generally speaking, it relates to takeovers and mergers which fall within the 
definition of an "affected transaction". 2 
Due to the history of securities legislation in South Africa, it was a further objective of 
the Code to bring about neutrality of treatment irrespective of the vehicle chosen to 
effect a takeover. During the course of this dissertation the success of the Code and 
Panel in achieving this objective of neutrality of treatment will be evaluated. More 
specifically, the question is asked whether the Code is applicable to a takeover 
irrespective of the method employed to effect such a takeover. The various methods 
to effect a takeover will be analysed with a view to establishing whether the same 
level of shareholder protection is afforded in all instances. 
The regulation of takeovers in South Africa is discussed and the exclusion of asset 
takeovers from the ambit of the Code and Panel is also considered. In conclusion a 
suggested solution is proposed, taking into account the current level of development 
of the South African law relating to the acquisition of securities. 
1 Introduced on 18 January 1991 and promulgated in terms of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
2 In section 440A ( 1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
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2. TAKEOVERS 
2.1 Definition 
Weinberg and Blank 3 define a "takeover" as "a transaction or series of transactions 
whereby a person (individual, group of individuals or company) acquires control over 
the assets of a company, either directly by becoming the owner of those assets or 
indirectly by obtaining control of the management of the company''. They distinguish 
a "takeove(' from a "merger'' which they describe as "a marriage between two 
companies, usually of roughly equal size, although it is quite common to use the 
word merger to include takeovers as well". 4 
A "takeover'' is more narrowly defined in LAWSA 5 as "the acquisition of the control 
of a company ...... by a person or company, usually accomplished by the acquisition 
or cancellation or redemption or issue (or by some combination of these) of a 
sufficient number of shares in the company to establish that control". It is, however, 
stated that the term "takeover'' also refers to "the acquisition of control of the board 
of the company by obtaining sufficient proxies from the company's shareholders" 
and also to "the sale by a company of its business or all its assets". 6 
The fundamental purpose of a takeover is therefore the acquisition of control over 
the net assets of a company. 
3 L Rabinowitz eta/ Weinberg and Blank on Take-overs and Mergers 5th Edition (1989) 1001 
4 In section 440A ( 1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
5 Par252 
6 W A Joubert (General Editor) The Law of South Africa First Reissue Volume 4 Part 1 (1995) Companies by M S Blackman 
par 252 footnote 2 
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For ease of reference the terms "offeror'' and "offeree company" will be used 
throughout this dissertation. The "offeror'' relates to the party effecting a takeover 
and "offeree company'' relates to the company which is the subject of the takeover. 
Although more limited definitions are awarded to these terms in the Securities 
Regulation Code on Takeovers and Mergers, these terms will be used in this 
dissertation in a wider sense unless otherwise stated. 
2.2 Reasons for takeovers 
Many reasons can be identified why a company or person ("the offeror'') might wish 
to acquire control over another company ("the offeree company''). Weinberg and 
Blank 7 distinguish between six main classes of motives why a company may wish to 
acquire control of an offeree company: 
" (i) The offeror can acquire the assets or shares of the offeree company at less 
than the value which the offeror places upon them, i.e. acquiring the assets 
at a discount. 8 
(ii) The offeror can, by taking over the offeree company, acquire the right to its 
profits at a lower multiple than the market places on the offeror's own profits, 
i.e. acquiring earnings at a discount. 9 
(iii) There is a trade advantage or element of synergy in bringing the two 
companies under single control, which is believed will result in the combined 
enterprise producing greater or more certain earnings than the sum of 
earnings of the two companies. 10 
7 L Rabinowitz eta/ Weinberg and Blank on Take-overs and Mergers 5th Edition (1989) 1025 
8 L Rabinowitz eta/ Weinberg and Blank on Take-overs and Mergers 5th Edition (1989) 1025 
9 L Rabinowitz eta/ Weinberg and Blank on Take-overs and Mergers 5th Edition (1989) 1025 
10 L Rabinowitz eta/ Weinberg and Blank on Take-overs and Mergers 5th Edition (1989) 1025 
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(iv) The takeover represents an attractive way for the offeror to enter a new 
market on a substantial scale. 11 
(v) The offeror has particular reasons for increasing its capital including the 
acquisition of a company with a large proportion of liquid assets or easily 
realisable assets instead of making a rights issue, and the acquisition of a 
company with high asset backing by a company whose market capitalisation 
includes a large element of goodwill. 12 
(vi) The takeover is the result of the motives of management of one or the other 
of the companies, either because of the aggressive desire to build up an 
empire or for personal remuneration or the defensive desire to make the 
company bid-proof. 13 
To this list may be added the acquisition of technology. Rather than spending vast 
amounts of money on the development of specific technology it might be acquired 
by taking over another company which has already developed such technology. 14 
Another possible reason could be the acquisition of strategic personnel as in the 
case of the acquisition of Finansbank by the Ned bank group. 15 
Usually elements of different motives will be intermingled in the decision to take over 
a company. 
11 L Rabinowitz eta/ Weinberg and Blank on Take-overs and Mergers 5th Edition (1989) 1026 
12 L Rabinowitz eta/ Weinberg and Blank on Take-overs and Mergers 5th Edition (1989) 1026 
13 L Rabinowitz eta/ Weinberg and Blank on Take-overs and Mergers 5th Edition (1989) 1026 
14 J Coetzee "Hoe om 'n maatskappy te koop" (28 Junia 1991) Finansies en Tegniek 34 
15 J Coetzee "Hoe om 'n maatskappy te koop" (28 Junia 1991) Finansies en Tegniek 34 
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2.3 Techniques of achieving a takeover 
2.3.1 Introduction 
There are a number of methods by which a takeover can be effected. 16 The various 
methods differ in the extent of support required from the directors or shareholders of 
the two companies concerned and in the extent to which the Court may have a role 
to play. The method chosen in any particular case will depend on a number of 
factors. A discussion of these factors, however, does not fall within the ambit of this 
dissertation. 17 
During the course of this dissertation not all techniques of achieving a takeover will 
be analysed. The discussion will be limited to those techniques which are most 
frequently utilised in practice. In this regard specific emphasis will be placed on the 
scheme of arrangement, reduction of capital, conversion of securities and sale of 
assets methods. Particular reference will also be made to a takeover by means of a 
purchase or exchange of shares which is the most obvious means of effecting a 
takeover. Other possible methods will only be mentioned in passing. Section 2 will 
deal with the typical operation of these methods in practice, the impact of the 
Companies Act 18 on these methods and the approach adopted by our Courts in 
dealing with the various methods of effecting a takeover. Reference will also be 
made to the views of legal writers. 
16 See e.g. L Rabinowitz eta/ Weinberg and Blank on Take-overs and Mergers 5th Edition (1989) 2001 and MM Katz "Legal 
aspects of the regulation of take-overs" ( 1979) Modem Business Law 53 
17 For a discussion of the various factors influencing the decision on which method to utilise, see L Rabinowitz eta/ Weinberg 
and Blank on Take-overs and Mergers 5th Edition (1989) 2001 
18 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
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In section 3 the impact of the Securities Regulation Code on Takeovers and Mergers 
on these techniques of achieving a takeover will be analysed in so far as they 
constitute "affected transactions". 
Section 3.1 will specifically deal with the historical development of the regulation of 
takeovers in South Africa. The position prior to 1991, as regulated by the 
Companies Acts of 1926 and 1973, 19 will be discussed. The regulation, or lack 
thereof, of the various techniques of effecting a takeover prior to .1991 will also be 
discussed. 
2.3.2 Scheme of a"angement procedure 
2.3.2.1 The use of section 311 20 
From time to time companies are required to negotiate with persons such as 
creditors and shareholders, who have claims against the company, in order to 
amend such claims in the interest of all parties. 21 However, these claims are often 
held by large groups of persons, making it impossible for the company to negotiate 
with every individual person. 22 There is therefore a need for a procedure in terms 
whereof the company may negotiate collectively with such a group. 23 A mechanism 
is also necessary which enables the company to bind all members of the specific 
group to an agreement which has been reached with the majority of that group. 24 
19 Companies Act 46 of 1926 and Companies Act 61 of 1973 
20 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
21 H S Cilliers et aJ Korporatiewe Reg 2nd Edition ( 1992) 44 7 
22 H S Cilliers et aJ Korporatiewe Reg 2nd Edition ( 1992) 44 7 
23 H S Cilliers et aJ Korporatiewe Reg 2nd Edition ( 1992) 44 7 
24 H S Cilliers et aJ Korporatiewe Reg 2nd Edition ( 1992) 44 7 
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Although such a procedure or mechanism is often created contractually, e.g. in the 
constitution of a company, it could happen that the relevant rights which the parties 
wish to amend may not be altered in terms of the specific contract or the parties 
which the company wishes to negotiate with are not parties to such a contract and 
therefore not bound by the contract. 25 
Accordingly, the Companies Act 26 has created such procedures and mechanisms to 
ensure that an enforceable agreement can be reached with shareholders and/or 
creditors. 27 Such a procedure and mechanism have been created in section 311 of 
the Companies Act. 28 This section makes it possible to reach a compromise or 
arrangement between a company and its members and/or creditors. 
Where a compromise or arrangement is proposed between a company and its 
creditors or any class of them or between a company and its members or any class 
of them, section 311 (1) 29 provides for an application to Court upon which the Court 
may order a meeting of creditors or a class of creditors or of the members of the 
Company or class of members, as the case may be, in such a manner as the Court 
may direct. 
Section 311 (2) 30 further provides that the proposed compromise or arrangement 
must be approved by a 75% majority and sanctioned by the Court for it to become 
binding. A second application to Court, for sanctioning, is therefore required. 
25 H S Cilliers eta/ Korporafiewe Reg 2nd Edition ( 1992) 448 
26 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
27 H S Cilliers eta/ Korporatiewe Reg 2nd Edition ( 1992) 448 
28 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
29 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
30 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
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Although this was clearly not the original purpose of section 311, 31 the scheme of 
arrangement became a popular vehicle to achieve a takeover of a company. The 
original motive for using this procedure to effect a takeover was to avoid the 
payment of stamp duty on the transfer of shares. 32 By virtue of section 23, read 
with Item 15 (4) of Schedule 1 of the Stamp Duties Act, 33 this is no longer the case 
and stamp duty is payable in the case of a scheme of arrangement. 34 Although the 
stamp duty advantage fell away, the scheme of arrangement procedure to effect a 
takeover remained popular due to its less onerous requirements if compared to the 
requirements of the substantive takeover provisions 35 in the Companies Act. 36 The 
effect of the Securities Regulation Code on Takeovers and Mergers on the scheme 
of arrangement procedure will be dealt with in section 3 of this dissertation. 
An obiter remark by Plowman J in the English case of Re National Bank Ltd 37 
marked the commencement of the use of the scheme of arrangement procedure to 
effect a takeover. 38 In this case the learned Judge held 39 that the relevant scheme 
of arrangement in that case only had to comply with the English scheme of 
arrangement requirements and not with their section 209 40 which required a 90% 
majority to approve the scheme. Although the scheme of arrangement under 
discussion was not a true takeover bid, the implication of the judgement was that 
such a takeover bid could be effected by means of a scheme of arrangement to the 
exclusion of the substantive takeover provisions in their Act. 41 
31 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
32 M M Katz "Legal aspects of the regulation of take-overs" ( 1979) Modem Business Law 55 
33 Companies Act 77 of 1968 
34 H S Cilliers eta/ Korporatiewe Reg 2nd Edition ( 1992) 463 
35 The now repealed sections 314 - 321 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
36 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
37 [1966] 1 All ER 1006 at 1012- 1013 
38 5 W L de Villiers "Take-overs under section 311 to 321 of the Companies Act 1973" ( 1973) SAW 351 
39 At 1012 
40 Of the Companies Act, 1948 
41 This was the interpretation of theRe National Bank Ltd Judgement in Ex Parte Federa/e Nywerhede Beperk 1975 (1) SA 826 
(W)at830 
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Plowman J continued and stated that the fact that the Court needs to determine the 
fairness of the scheme before sanctioning such a scheme offered sufficient 
protection to shareholders. 42 Even though a smaller majority (75% as opposed to 
90%) is required to approve a scheme of arrangement, further protection is provided 
by the Court's supervision. 
In Ex Parte Federale Nywerhede Bpk 43 Coetzee J endorsed the view of Plowman J 
and held that there was no reason why a takeover could not be effected by means 
of a scheme of arrangement as long as it is a compromise or arrangement between 
the company and its members and/or creditors. 44 This, he held, 45 was true in the 
case of both a scheme of arrangement under the old section 103 of the Companies 
Act of 1926 46 and in terms of section 311 of the new Companies Act of 1973. 47 
Although Coetzee J found it odd that the old sections 314 to 321 48 could be 
circumvented with ease by utilising section 311, 49 he was of the opinion that should 
there be a need to remedy this position this should be done by the Legislature. 50 
De Villiers 51 expressed criticism against the fact that a takeover could be effected by 
means of section 311 of the Companies Act 52 to the exclusion of the substantive 
takeover provisions contained in section 314 to 321 of the Companies Act. 53 He 
was critical of the fact that two procedures with "vastly different safeguards and 
42 At 1013 
43 1975 (1) SA 826 (W) 
44 At 830 - 831 
45 At 831 - 832 
46 Companies Act 46 of 1926 
47 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
48 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
49 Of CompaniesAct 61 of 1973 
50 At832 
51 S W L de Villiers "Take-overs under section 311 to 321 of the Companies Act 1973" (1973) SALJ350 
52 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
53 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
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requirements, imposing vastly different responsibilities on persons responsible for 
supplying information to offeree shareholders" were available to offerors. 54 
Differently stated, there was no neutrality of treatment between the various methods 
of effecting a takeover. 
Despite criticism like that of De Villiers and others, the legal position was again 
confirmed in Ex Parte SATBEL (Pty) Ltd (Meyer N 0 intervening). 55 Gordon AJ 
held 56 that there was no bar to proceeding in terms of section 311 57 if the 
requirements of that section are met even if the scheme amounts to a takeover. 
In Ex Parte Mielie-Kip Ltd 58 Flemming DJP did not disagree with the position that 
section 311 59 could be used to effect a takeover. However, he confirmed that the 
Court's discretion to confirm such a scheme of arrangement should not be exercised 
in favour of an applicant if the proposed arrangement "can conveniently and 
effectively be carried out by the company and its creditors without involving the 
provisions of the section". 60 The fact that the substantive provisions of section 
314 61 were more "cumbersome and time-consuming" than the scheme of 
arrangement procedure was not sufficient and the application was denied. 62 
The conclusion that can be reached from the above is that the scheme of 
arrangement procedure 63 could be used to effect a takeover despite the criticisriL 
against this position. However, all the requirements of section 311 64 must have 
54 S W L de Villiers "Take-overs under section 311 to 321 of the Companies Act 1973" ( 1973) SAW 366 
55 1987(3)SA440(W)at446 
56 At446 
57 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
58 1991 (3) SA 449 (W) at 455 
59 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
60 At455 
61 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
62 At455 
63 In terms of section 311 of Act 61 of 1973 
64 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
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been met before the Court would exercise its discretion to approve the scheme. The 
fact that the scheme of arrangement procedure provided a more expeditious method 
of effecting a takeover was not sufficient ground for allowing such an application. 
The desirability of the use of this procedure under the current dispensation will be 
dealt with in section 5 of this dissertation. 
2.3.2.2 Structuring a scheme of arrangement to effect a takeover 
In practice, when the scheme of arrangement procedure is utilised to effect a 
takeover, the takeover is structured in the following manner : 
The takeover is cast in the form of a reorganisation of the authorised and issued, or 
just the issued, share capital of the offeree company. 65 In terms of this 
reorganisation the offeror is in effect substituted for the existing shareholders of the 
offeree company. 66 The reorganisation is effected by means of a scheme of 
arrangement between the offeree company and its shareholders 67 whose shares 
will be affected by the scheme. 68 A scheme of arrangement is submitted to the 
shareholders of the offeree company for approval in terms whereof the issued share 
capital not held by or on behalf of the offeror is cancelled by means of a capital 
reduction. 69 The proceeds of the cancellation, which is equal to the nominal value 
of the cancelled shares, is then placed to the credit of a special capital reserve 
account created for that purpose. 70 Simultaneously with the reduction of capital the 
share capital of the offeree company is again increased, usually to its full former 
65 S W L de Villiers "Take-overs under section 311 to 321 of the Companies Act 1973" (1973)SAW351 
66 S W L de Villiers "Take-overs under section 311 to 321 of the Companies Act 1973" ( 1973) SAW 351 
67 In terms of section 311 of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
66 S W L de Villiers "Take-overs under section 311 to 321 of the Companies Act 1973" (1973) SALJ351 
69 S W L de Villiers "Take-overs under section 311 to 321 of the Companies Act 1973" (1973) SALJ 351 
70 S W L de Villiers "Take-overs under section 311 to 321 of the Companies Act 1973" (1973) SALJ 352 
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value, by the creation of new shares which are, in turn, allotted to the offeror as fully 
paid-up by applying the credit amount on the special capital reserve. 71 
In consideration for the above allotment of new shares to it, the offeror then allots an 
agreed number of its shares or pays the agreed consideration to the former 
shareholders of the offeree company. 72 Through the above process the offeror 
becomes the holder of all the issued shares, or all the issued shares of a certain 
class in the offeree company. 
A typical illustration of the above procedure can be seen in Ex Parte Federale 
Nywerhede Beperk. 73 In casu the scheme of arrangement procedure was used in 
conjunction with a reduction of capital as described above. The takeover took the 
form of a cancellation of the company's issued shares held by "outside 
shareholders" (that is, the shares which did not belong to the applicant's holding 
company). In return, shares in the holding company were to be issued to such 
outside shareholders. 74 The cancellation of the shares was effected by way of a 
reduction of capital. 75 The offeror, who in effect was substituted for the holders of 
the cancelled shares, had to issue the shares to the shareholders as consideration 
for the cancellation. 76 
The holding company of the applicant, which was to issue the new shares in 
consideration, was not a party to the contract. To overcome this problem, the Court 
ordered that a suitable contract between the applicant and the holding company, 
71 S W l de Villiers 'Take-overs under section 311 to 321 of the Companies Act 1973" ( 1973) SALJ 352 
72 S W l de Villiers "Take-overs under section 311 to 321 of the Companies Act 1973" ( 1973) SAW 352 
73 1975 (1) SA 826 (W) 
74 At828 
75 At828 
76 At 828 - 829 
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77 At835 
providing for the issuing of the relevant shares, had to be submitted to the Registrar 
before the court order could be uplifted. 77 This order was also given to overcome 
the perceived problem that, should such an order not be given, the scheme might 
constitute a confiscation without any "compensating advantage" given to the 
shareholders who were expropriated. 78 
A reduction of capital must be effected in terms of the provisions of the Companies 
Act that regulate such reductions. 79 Utilising the scheme of arrangement procedure, 
in conjunction with a reduction of capital, does not exempt the offeror of also 
complying with the relevant capital reduction provisions in the Companies Act. 80 In 
so far as a reduction of capital constitutes a component of the scheme of 
arrangement, it cannot be achieved solely by means of the scheme of 
arrangement. 81 This was confirmed in clear terms by the Court in Ex Parte NBSA 
Centre Ltd 82 where it was said that : 
"Sections 83 - 88 govern reduction of capital in clear peremptory terms and 
there is no way that this kind of reduction can be achieved in any other shape 
or form, be it in purported scheme of arrangement fashion or any other ... 
There is not the slightest warrant anywhere in the Act for even a faint 
argument that a company's capital can legally be reduced in any other way 
than by the applicable reduction procedure". 
78 See page 835 of the judgement 
79 Sections 83 - 90 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
8° Companies Act 61 of 1973 
81 Ex Parte NBSA Centre Ltd 1987 (2) SA 783 (T) 
82 1987 (2) SA 783 (T) at 794 
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The scheme of arrangement procedure is not only used where the offeree company 
is in financial difficulty. However, utilising the scheme of arrangement procedure to 
effect a takeover represents the most expeditious and economic means of acquiring 
a company in financial difficulties and, at the same time, ridding the company of its 
existing creditors. 83 The utilisation of the procedure laid down by section 311 has 
definite advantages. The biggest advantage of section 311 is that it allows an 
offeror to take over a company in financial difficulty at a price just sufficient to 
exceed the dividend to creditors which would have been paid in case of a 
liquidation. 84 The company is thus taken over without the burden of creditors, often 
with a large assessed loss with its accompanying tax advantages. 85 
When compared to some other methods of achieving a takeover, the scheme of 
arrangement procedure also offers substantial protection to minority shareholders 
during a takeover. 86 The minority protection offered by this procedure includes : 
• A prescribed majority of the affected shareholders must approve the scheme. 87 
• The Court is a participant to the scheme by virtue of the fact that it needs to 
sanction the proposed scheme. 88 
• The Court appoints a chairman who supervises the necessary meeting. 89 
• The explanatory statement in terms of section 312 90 which provides for 
compulsory disclosure. 91 
83 Richard Jooste "Schemes of Arrangement- a New Developmenr (February 1989) Income Tax Reporter 7 
84 Richard Jooste "Schemes of Arrangement- An Answer to the Problem?" (March 1989) Businessman's Law 133 
85 Richard Jooste "Schemes of Arrangement- An Answer to the Problem?" (March 1989) Businessman's Law 133 
86 M M Katz "Legal Aspects of the Regulation of Take-overs" ( 1979) Modern Business Law 55 
87 M M Katz "Legal Aspects of the Regulation of Take-overs" ( 1979) Modern Business Law 55 
88 M M Katz "Legal Aspects of the Regulation of Take-overs" ( 1979) Modern Business Law 55 
89 M M Katz "Legal Aspects of the Regulation of Take-overs" ( 1979) Modern Business Law 55 
90 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
91 M M Katz "Legal Aspects of the Regulation of Take-overs" ( 1979) Modern Business Law 55 
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A further benefit of the scheme of arrangement procedure highlighted by Katz 92 is 
the possibility of a physical merger of assets and liabilities of the offeror and offeree 
companies in terms of section 313 of the Companies Act. 93 
2.3.2.3 Judicial approach to "arrangements" 
Section 311 and 312 94 provide for numerous requirements which need to be 
complied with in order to achieve a successful scheme of arrangement. Most of 
these requirements are clear and have provided few problems of interpretation to 
parties to a scheme of arrangement. Consequently, this dissertation will not attempt 
to deal with all requirements or to be an exhaustive guide on the requirements for a 
successful scheme of arrangement. The discussion in this paragraph will be limited 
to some of the controversial aspects of section 311 95 which have resulted in 
conflicting judgements by our Courts in recent years. 
Section 311 96 requires a compromise or arrangement between a company and its 
creditors or any class of them or between a company and its members or any class 
of them. In interpreting this requirement two issues have emerged as a primary 
source of legal uncertainty in South Africa. These are the question as to what 
constitutes an acceptable "compensating advantage" when minority shareholders 
are expropriated and, secondly, the requirement that the offeree company must be a 
true participant to the scheme of arrangement. 
92 M M Katz "Legal Aspects of the Regulation ofTake-overs" (1979) Modem Business Law 55 
93 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
94 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
95 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
96 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
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Compensating advantage 
Confirmation of a scheme of arrangement to effect a takeover usually has the effect 
that at least some of the members of the offeree company are expropriated. This is 
a necessary consequence of the section 311 97 mechanism in terms whereof the 
minority is bound by the decision of the majority. As to how such expropriated 
members should be compensated there have been divergent views. 
One of the first cases to address this issue was Re NFU Development Trust. 98 In 
this case Brightman J held 99 that : 
"Confiscation is not my idea of an arrangement. A member whose rights are 
expropriated without any compensating advantage is not, in my view, having 
his rights re-arranged in any legitimate sense of that expression." 
In 1975 Coetzee J cited the above dictum of Brightman J with approval in Ex Parte 
Federale Nywerhede Bpk. 100 The learned Judge added 101 that this "compensating 
advantage" refers to an enforceable compensation. The question as to what would 
constitute an acceptable "compensating advantage" has provided some difficulty to 
our Courts during subsequent years. 
97 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
98 [1973] 1 All ER 135 (Ch) 
99 At 140 
100 1975(1)SA826(W)at834 
101 At834 
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In Ex Parte SATBEL (Edms) Bpk : in re Meyer en andere v SATBEL (Edms) Bpk 102 
the Court was asked to pronounce upon a proposed scheme of arrangement in 
terms whereof one of the majority shareholders attempted to take over the shares of 
the minority shareholders for a monetary consideration of R6 per share. Coetzee J 
held 103 that to qualify as an arrangement there must be at least a re-arranging of 
shareholders' rights. 104 An exchange of shares for membership in a controlling 
company would qualify as such a re-arranging of rights. However, should the 
members' rights be extinguished in exchange for a monetary compensation, ex-
propriation takes place and his rights are not "re-arranged in any legitimate sense of 
that expression". 105 
The Court continued 106 by stating that the members' rights must continue to exist, 
albeit in a different guise, but should not be extinguished. In casu the Court 
therefore held that the proposed scheme of arrangement entailed the destruction of 
interests and accordingly refused to sanction the proposed scheme of 
arrangement. 107 Coetzee J was therefore emphatic in his rejection of a monetary 
consideration as an acceptable "compensating advantage" for expropriated 
members. 
102 1984 (4) SA 347 (W) 
103 At359 
104 At359 
105 At359 
106 At359 
107 At359 
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The approach of Coetzee J was followed in the case of Ex Parte Natal Coal 
Exploration Co Ltd 108 where it was held 109 that expropriation of rights of a 
shareholder, compensated by a sum of money, lies outside the ambit of an 
"arrangement" in terms of section 311. 110 A shareholder must receive a 
"compensating advantage" which consists of or includes other rights. The facts and 
circumstances of each case will determine what other rights will be adequate for 
purposes of section 311. 111 
The Court therefore followed the ratio of the SATBEL case 112 and dismissed the 
application. Stegmann J specifically held 113 that "the practical implications of the 
conclusions to which I am driven in this matter by the decision in the SA TBEL case 
do not appear to me to be disturbing or to depart in any way from what may be taken 
to have been the intention of the Legislature." Stegmann J was therefore in 
agreement with Coetzee J that, even with a fair assessment of the compensation, a 
monetary consideration was not a fair "compensating advantage". 
The approach followed in the SATBEL 114 and Natal Coal Exploration 115 cases was 
rejected by Van den Heever J in Ex Parte Suiderland Development Corporation Ex 
Parte Kaap-Kunene Beleggings Bpk. 116 Van den Heever J stated that: 117 
108 1985 (4) SA 279 (W) 
109 At284 
110 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
111 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
112 1984 (4) SA 347 (W) 
113 At285 
114 1984 (4) SA 347 (W) 
115 1985 (4) SA 279 (W) 
116 1986 (2) SA 442 (C) 
117 At445 
18 
''Why the "compensating advantage" should have to take the form of 
retention of rights as members of the company, escapes me. There is 
nothing in any dictionary to compel such an interpretation". 
The learned Judge continued 118 and stated that if the Legislature wished to limit the 
ambit of an "arrangement" in terms of section 311 119 it would have done so by 
definition in the Act. Accordingly, there was no reason to limit the definition of an 
"arrangement" as contended by Stegmann J. 
In Ex Parte NBSA Centre Ltd 12° Coetzee DJP had a further opportunity to consider 
the correctness of his approach in the SATBEL 121 case. This time the Judge 
held 122 that "after further reflection" he was willing to concede that he was wrong in 
his interpretation of the ambit of "arrangement". In so far as he had decided that a 
cancellation of shares in return for a monetary consideration can not fall within the 
ambit of section 311, 123 this was a decision resting "too heavily on nuance and feel". 
Coetzee DJP therefore held 124 that to the extent that his approach was followed and 
developed by Stegmann J as the ratio decidendi of the Natal Coal Exploration 
case, 125 this was "equally wrong". 
118 At 445-446 
119 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
120 1987 (2) SA 783 (T) 
121 1984 (4) SA 347 (W) 
122 At792 
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In the NBSA case 126 Goldstone J, in his judgement, also confirmed that 
"expropriation for fair compensation is indeed a case of give and take". He accepted 
that a cash consideration did not exclude a scheme from the ambit of section 
311. 127 Although Coetzee DJP shared this view in his judgement, it was not the 
basis for his decision and can therefore not be regarded as ratio decidendi. 128 
In Ex Parte Mielie-Kip Ltd 129 Flemming DJP accepted that a scheme of arrangement 
in terms of section 311 130 may provide for the termination of the relationship 
between the shareholder and the company with or without substitution of a new 
relationship between the member and the company. Although this was again an 
obiter remark it is clear that the submission that a cash consideration is not an 
adequate "compensating advantage" will find very little support in our Courts. The 
question no longer seems to be whether a cash consideration is acceptable 
compensation for an expropriation, but rather whether there is a scheme of 
arrangement between the offeree company and the member. The proposed 
scheme must affect "the existence, scope or content of the relationship between the 
company and the member''. 131 
126 1987 (2) SA 783 (T) at 812 
127 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
128 Gordon AJ did not decide this matter in his concurring judgement. See page 813 of the judgement 
129 1991 (3) SA 449 (W) at 453 
130 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
131 Ex Parte Mielie-Kip Ltd 1991 (3) SA 449 (W) at 453 
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Participation of offeree company 
The scheme of arrangement procedure is only available if the scheme of 
arrangement is one between the offeree company and its members and/or 
creditors. 132 In other words, the company must be a true participant to the 
scheme. 133 Section 311 (1) 134 refers to a compromise or arrangement "proposed 
between a company and its creditors ... " or between "a company and its 
members ... ". The common denominator for section 311 to be applicable, is the 
participation of the company itself. It follows that the company, by way of a board 
resolution or by a majority of members in general meeting, must consent to the 
proposed arrangement. If the company's consent is not obtained the Court has no 
jurisdiction under section 311 135 to sanction an arrangement. 136 
The question whether the offeree company was a true participant to the scheme of 
arrangement arose in Ex Parte Federale Nywerhede Bpk. 137 The mechanics of the 
scheme were explained earlier in paragraph 2.3.2.2 but the relevant portion, for 
present purposes, was that the shares held by members other than the offeror were 
to be cancelled and that these expropriated members were to receive consideration 
for this cancellation in due course from the offeror. 138 The question arose whether 
in light of these facts the offeree company was a true participant to the scheme. The 
Court answered this question in the affirmative, holding that it was a reasonable 
implication of the scheme that there was an obligation on the offeree company to 
132 Section311 (1)oftheCompaniesAct61 of1973. 
133 Ex Parte Federa/e Nywerhede Bpk 1975 (1) SA 826 (W) at 830-831 
134 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
135 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
136 Richard Jooste "Schemes of Arrangement- An Answer to the Problem?" (March 1989) Businessman's Law 133 
137 1975 (1) SA 826 (W) 
138 At834 
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ensure that the expropriated members receive their consideration in due course from 
the offeror. 139 Although the Court accepted the above obligation of the offeree 
company as implicit to the proposed scheme, this obligation of the offeree company 
was not clear from the proposed scheme. As the Court insisted on an enforceable 
obligation, the learned Judge ordered the offeree company to file an acceptable 
contract, in terms whereof the offeror committed itself towards the members, with the 
Registrar before the court order could be uplifted. 140 In casu the Court thus gave a 
very wide interpretation to the requirement that the offeree company must be a true 
participant to the scheme. 
In Ex Parte SATBEL (Edms) Bpk: in Re Meyer en andere v SATBEL (Edms) Bpk 141 
the Court had a further opportunity to consider the required level of participation by 
the offeree company. During the course of proceedings 142 the Court was referred to 
the English case of Re Savoy Hotel Ltd 143 where the Chancery Division sanctioned 
a proposed scheme of arrangement in terms whereof the affected shareholders had 
the option of receiving shares in the offeror or receiving a monetary compensation 
for relinquishing their shares in the company. The only role of the offeree company 
was that it was obliged, in terms of the proposed scheme, to effect the transfer of the 
relevant shares. Coetzee J 144 rejected the view that the above was sufficient to 
qualify as an arrangement and held that the mere registration by the company of a 
transfer of shares is not sufficient to qualify as an "arrangement between the 
company and the member''. 
139 At834 
140 At 834 - 835 
141 1984 (4) SA 347 (W) 
142 At 359 - 360 
143 [1981] 3 All ER 646 (Ch) 
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The obligations of the offeree company in the SA TBEL case 145 were not dissimilar 
to the obligations of the offeree company in Ex Parte Federale Nywerhede Bpk. 146 
Yet the Court came to a different conclusion on the question whether the offeree 
company was a true participant to the scheme. In the SATBEL case the Court 
followed a more restrictive interpretation of this requirement. An approach, it is 
submitted, which is to be preferred. Should an offeror wish to utilise the mechanism 
of a scheme of arrangement to effect a takeover, which did not represent the 
substantive takeover mechanism, it is submitted that such an offeror should fully 
comply with all requirements of section 311. 147 It is further submitted that there is 
no reason why a liberal approach to interpreting the scheme of arrangement 
requirements should be endorsed. 
In Ex Parte Mielie-Kip Ltd 148 Flemming DJP considered the participation of the 
offeree company where the shareholders in the offeree company sold their shares to 
the offeror. The Court refused to sanction the scheme of arrangement, holding that 
the offeree company was not a true participant to the proposed scheme. 149 
The Court held that the purchase of shares is an arrangement between buyer and 
seller. "In no ordinary sense of the word is the sale an arrangement between the 
company and either the buyer or the seller''. 150 Accordingly, such an arrangement 
will not fall within the ambit of section 311, 151 not being an arrangement between 
the company and its members. The Court 152 continued by stating that "involvement 
145 1984 (4) SA 347 (W) 
146 1975 (1) SA 826 (W) 
147 OfCompaniesAct61 of1973 
148 1991 (3) SA 449 (W) 
149 At 455 - 456 
150 At451 
151 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
152 At451 
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in the transaction [by the company] is also not caused thereby that the issuer of the 
securities must, as other members of the community, respect the transaction or has 
an obligation to record the ensuing transfer of the shares". In casu the Court 
exercised its discretion to refuse the application because the proposed arrangement 
could conveniently and effectively be carried out by the company and its members 
without invoking the provisions of the section. 153 
During the course of his judgement Flemming DJP identified possible subject-
matters for an arrangement between a company and its members. 154 These 
included "the continued existence or not of issued or issuable shares; the 
consolidation or splitting of shares; the right of redemption, to dividends, in regard to 
voting, etc. attaching to shares". The fact that certain obligations were given to the 
"offeree company'', inter alia that it would have "supervised and administered" the 
payment by the offeror to its members, was not sufficient to make the "offeree 
company'' a participant to the scheme. 155 The sale of the shares in no way affected 
"the existence, scope or content of the relationship between the company and the 
member''. 156 Only the identity of the member would have changed and not the 
quality of the relationship between the member and company. 157 
In NAMEX (Edms) Bpk v Kommissaris van Binnelandse lnkomste 158 the Appellate 
Division had the opportunity to consider a scheme of arrangement entered into 
between a company and its creditors. In his judgement, 159 Goldstone AJ 
considered the required role of the company to qualify as a true participant to a 
153 At455 
154 At453 
155 At 451 and 453 
156 At453 
157 At 453 - 454 
158 1994 (2) SA 265 (A) 
159 At294 
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section 311 160 scheme of arrangement. He held 161 that section 311 162 schemes 
had a major role in the commercial world and as such the Courts should not give a 
restrictive interpretation to the requirements of the section. However, if the offeree 
company has only a passive role it is not a compromise or scheme proposed 
"between a company and its creditors". 163 
On the other hand it was held not to be necessary that the company's active role 
should be significant. 164 In casu he held that the term in the proposed scheme 
obliging the offeree company to cancel a certain agreement previously entered into 
by the provisional liquidators was sufficient to render the company a true participant. 
From this judgement it seems that the view of the Appellate Division is that a mere 
administrative role given to an offeree company in terms of a proposed scheme of 
arrangement is sufficient to bring the scheme within the ambit of section 311 of the 
Companies Act. 165 Although the remarks of Goldstone AJ were obiter, it is 
significant that his approach differed from that of Flemming DJP in Ex Parte Mielie-
Kip Ltd 166 who favoured a more restrictive approach. 167 
According to LA WSA 168 "there seems to be no reason why the company and its 
members cannot enter into a scheme of arrangement in terms of which the members 
bind themselves to the company to transfer their shares to a third party, coupled with 
160 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
161 At294 
162 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
163 At294 
164 At 294 
165 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
166 1991 (3) SA 449 (W) 
167 See also MP Larkin "Company Law Legislation" ( 1987) Annual Survey of South African Law 256 at 267. Larkin also 
disagreed with an interpretation of section 311 of the Companies Act which insists upon an active role or involvement by 
the company as opposed to just insisting that the company agree to the compromise or arrangement. His approach is 
therefore in line with that of Goldstone AJ in the Namex case. 
168 Par254 
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an undertaking, as a condition precedent, given by the third party to the company to 
deliver the proposed consideration to its members." This statement can not be 
endorsed unequivocally. The essence of the transaction remains that of a sale of 
shares by the members to an offeror. The mere adding of administrative duties to 
the company should not be sufficient to render the company a true participant to the 
scheme. Although there is some degree of conflict between the approaches 
adopted in Ex Parte Federale Nywerhede Bpk 169 and Namex 170 on the one hand, 
and that in Ex Parte Mielie-Kip Ltd, 171 it is submitted that the approach in Mielie-Kip 
is the preferred approach. The intention of section 311 172 was never to cater for a 
simple sale of shares. The question that needs to be answered is whether the 
scheme of arrangement procedure should be used to effect a takeover at all. This 
question will be reverted to in section 5 of this dissertation. 
In conclusion, Delport 173 endorses the view expressed in Ex Parte NBSA Centre 
Limited 174 that the scheme of arrangement procedure is to be used only where the 
normal mechanisms for reaching agreement between members on the one hand 
and the company on the other are not available due to the content of the particular 
scheme. He states that the confusion and uncertainties that prevail in the present 
system will only fade if this is done. This aspect will be reverted to in section 5. 
169 1975 (1) SA 826 (W) 
170 1994 (2) SA 265 (A) (Obiter remarks of Goldstone AJ) 
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2.3.3 Reduction of capital method 
As was pointed out in the previous section, the scheme of arrangement procedure 
can be combined with the reduction of capital method to effect a takeover. It is, 
however, also possible to effect a takeover by means of the reduction of capital 
method without utilising the scheme of arrangement procedure. 175 In practice a 
typical example of this procedure is as follows : 
(a) The offeror, wishing to obtain the total issued share capital of the offeree 
company, is either the holding company of the offeree company, has a 
number of shares in the offeree company or purchases a small number of 
shares in the offeree company. 176 
(b) After passing a special resolution the offeree company then approaches the 
Court, applying for an order in terms of section 84{1) 177 to confirm the 
reduction of its share capital by cancelling the shares of all shareholders 
apart from those shares held by the offeror. 178 
(c) A surplus arises from this cancellation of shares which is credited to a non-
distributable reserve account in the books of the offeree company. 179 
(d) The offeror, which was not a party to the application to Court, now provides 
the holders of the cancelled shares with shares in the offeror company, or 
cash, or with a combination of these two in consideration for the cancellation 
of their shares. 180 This consideration is given as a quid pro quo for 
175 In terms of section 84 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
176 M M Katz "Legal Aspects of the Regulation of Take-overs" (1979) Modern Business Law 56 
177 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
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consenting to the reduction of capital and is given after registration of the 
relevant special resolution and the surrendering of the share certificates by 
these former members. 181 
Katz 182 raised compelling arguments in favour of the proposition that it is not legally 
competent to use the reduction of capital procedure to achieve a takeover bid. In 
support of his contention he presented two categories of arguments, those of form 
and those of substance. 183 His arguments of form are as follows : 
• As the consideration emanates from the offeror, and not from the offeree 
company, there is no genuine reduction of capital. This is borne out by the fact 
that despite having its share capital reduced, the offeree company's assets 
remain intact. 184 
• Despite paying the consideration to the minority shareholders of the offeree 
company, the offeror is not a party to the reduction of capital proceedings. 185 
Katz's arguments of substance can be summarised as follows : 
• A takeover offer has substantial commercial implications for the minority 
shareholders of the offeree company who are divested of their shares against 
their will, receiving another asset as consideration which they did not choose. 186 
• He submits that the expropriation of shares in an offeree company should only be 
achieved by way of consent of the relevant shareholders or the use of an express 
181 H S Cilliers eta/ Korporatiewe Reg 2nd Edition (1992) 463 
182 M M Katz "Legal Aspects of the Regulation ofTake-overs" (1979) Modern Business Law 56-57 
183 M M Katz ""Legal Aspects of the Regulation ofTake-overs" (1979) Modern Business Law 56 
184 M M Katz ''Legal Aspects of the Regulation of Take-overs" ( 1979) Modern Business Law 56 
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framework for the achievement of such an enforced expropriation. 187 The 
Companies Act 188 has only provided two frameworks for an enforced 
expropriation of shares namely the provisions of what is now chapter XVA and 
the Code, and the provisions of a section 311 scheme of arrangement. 189 
• The reason for limiting the compulsory expropriation procedures was to ensure 
adequate protection for minority shareholders. 190 In view of these facts, Katz is 
of the opinion that, as the reduction of capital procedure does not provide the 
same protection to minority shareholders as the other available procedures, the 
reduction of capital procedure is not a competent or desirable method of 
achieving a takeover. In his view the possible stamp duty saving occasioned by 
the reduction of capital method was not a sufficient reason to sacrifice the 
interests of minority shareholders. 191 
Although Katz readily concedes that there is "eminent legal authority'' contrary to his 
point of view, it is submitted that his view was the correct one in the interests of 
shareholder protection. Whether this still holds true in the current dispensation will 
be dealt with later in this section. 
An important aspect for consideration is the relationship between the scheme of 
arrangement procedure and the reduction of capital method. The relationship 
between these two methods was discussed in Ex Parte NBSA Centre Ltd. 192 In his 
judgement, 193 Coetzee DJP stated that "once one has to resort to section 84 of the 
[Companies] Act to effect a reduction of capital, it seems to follow that there is no 
187 M M Katz "Legal Aspects of the Regulation of Take-overs" (1979) Modern Business Law 56 
188 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
189 M M Katz "Legal Aspects of the Regulation of Take-overs" ( 1979) Modern Business Law 56 
190 M M Katz "Legal Aspects of the Regulation ofTake-overs· (1979) Modern Business Law 56 
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longer room for the application of section 311 unless this is merely part of a larger 
scheme which can only be accommodated under this section, and of which the 
reduction procedure is a condition precedent to its functioning". In the course of his 
judgement 194 he also referred to the English case of Re Robert Stephen Holdings 
Ltd 195 where Plowman J held that it is desirable to proceed by way of scheme of 
arrangement where the reduction of capital involves one part of a class of 
shareholders being treated differently from another part of the same class. Plowman 
J referred to this as the "usual practice" as this procedure afforded better protection 
to minority shareholders than the reduction of capital procedure. 
In so far as South African textbook writers, such as Cilliers and Benade and 
Henochsberg, cite Re Robert Stephen Holdings Ltd 196 as authority for the 
proposition that in these cases the section 311 197 procedure can be utilised to the 
exclusion of the statutory reduction of capital procedure, Coetzee DJP confessed "to 
being mystified by these statements". 198 The learned Judge referred to this as "utter 
nonsense". 199 Sections 83 to 88 200 govern reduction of capital in "clear peremptory 
terms" and there is no way that this kind of reduction can be achieved in any other 
shape or form, be it in purported scheme of arrangement fashion or any other. 
Coetzee DJP reiterated 201 that "no Court has the power to effect this reduction [of 
capital] by any other route and if it purports to do so its order is similarly a nullity as it 
has no jurisdiction to fly in the face of clear and peremptory statutory enactments". 
194 At792 
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The above views of Coetzee DJP should be compared to that of an earlier case. In 
Ex Parte Natal Coal Exploration Co Ltd 202 Stegmann J interpreted the reference in 
Re Robert Stephen Holdings Ltd to the "better protection" for minority shareholders 
when using the scheme of arrangement procedure, where the reduction of capital 
involves one part of a class of shareholders being treated differently from another 
part of the same class, in a different way to Coetzee DJP in Ex Parte NBSA Centre 
Ltd. 203 He saw the "better protection" and the desirability of the section 311 204 
procedure not as excluding the statutory capital reduction procedure in terms of 
section 84 of the Companies Act, 205 but as supplementary thereto. 
Stegmann J was of the opinion that the two procedures could be used in conjunction 
and held 206 that the "better protection" afforded by section 311 is at least fourfold. It 
can be summarised as follows : 
• The benefit of a separate meeting for the minority. 
• The minority must receive the benefit of a section 312 207 statement. 208 
• The proposal needs the support of the holders of 75% of the minority shares. 
• The size of the minority which is dependant upon the Court's discretion for the 
protection of its rights is dramatically reduced. 
202 1985 (4) SA 279 (W) at 281-283 
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Coetzee DJP, 209 in turn, stated that he was "not persuaded that the arrangement 
procedure, however it may be fitted into a reduction of capital procedure, can 
possibly lead to greater protection." Larkin 210 correctly, it is submitted, questions 
this statement by Coetzee DJP. Reference was earlier made to Katz 211 who 
convincingly argued that the scheme of arrangement procedure provides better 
protection to minority shareholders than the reduction of capital method. The fact 
that the Court has a discretion in both instances not to confirm the scheme or 
reduction, does not alter the fact that lesser protection is afforded by the reduction of 
capital procedure. 212 In any event, the fact remains that the Natal Coal approach is 
preferable i.e. the use of section 311 213 does not exclude the use of the capital 
reduction provisions of the Companies Act, 214 but is supplementary thereto in order 
to provide better protection to minority shareholders. 
As will be shown in section 3.5 the Securities Regulation Code on Take-overs and 
Mergers has been made applicable to takeovers effected by both of these methods. 
In section 5 it will be shown, however, that the Code is not always applicable and, in 
these cases, the scheme of arrangement procedure still provides better protection. 
Even where the Code is applicable the scheme of arrangement procedure provides 
better protection e.g. the involvement of the Court and the holding of separate 
meetings by separate classes. The above debate is therefore not only of academic 
value and the Natal Coal approach remains preferable. Katz's views that the 
scheme of arrangement procedure should be used rather than the reduction of 
209 In Ex Parte NBSA Centre Ltd 1987 (2) SA 783 (T) at 800 
210 M P Larkin "Company Law Legislation" ( 1987) Annual Survey of South African Law 269 
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capital method are, therefore, still valid under the current dispensation in those 
instances where the Code is not applicable to the relevant transaction. 215 
2.3.4 Redeemable preference shares method 
A takeover may be effected by converting all the shares in the offeree company not 
held by the offeror into redeemable preference shares and providing for their 
redemption from the proceeds of a new issue of shares to the offeror. 216 An 
example of this procedure is where a holding company wishes to convert a 
subsidiary into a wholly owned subsidiary. The shares of the non-controlling 
shareholders are converted into redeemable preference shares by way of special 
resolution in terms of section 75 (1) (i) of the Companies Act. 217 The offeree 
company then issues new shares to the holding company in terms of section 98 (1) 
and (2) of the Act. 218 The proceeds of this issue are then utilised to redeem the 
preference shares of the non-controlling shareholders resulting in the offeree 
company becoming a wholly owned subsidiary of the acquiring company. 219 
Although the preference share conversion and redemption technique could be used 
on its own, it can also be used as an integral part of a scheme of arrangement. In 
Ex Parte Garlick Ltd 220 the offeror wished to obtain the shares of the minority 
shareholders in the applicant company. A scheme of arrangement was proposed to 
effect the takeover of the company. The scheme inter alia entailed the conversion of 
ordinary shares into redeemable preference shares. 221 The scheme was opposed 
215 The impact of Rule 29 of the Securities Regulation Code on Take Overs and Mergers will be considered in section 3. 
216 Section 75 (1) (i), 98 and 99 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
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by one of the minority shareholders inter alia upon the grounds that the scheme was 
not an arrangement between the applicant and its members as required by section 
311, 222 it being contended that it was merely an arrangement in terms of which the 
offeror acquired all the shares in the applicant without the applicant being party to 
the arrangement. 223 The Court held that: 224 
"These provisions show that the company is very much a party to the 
scheme. The scheme which involves a reconstruction of the applicant's 
capital, without which it cannot be carried into effect, is not merely one 
between [the offeror] and applicant's shareholders. I am accordingly satisfied 
that the scheme qualified as an arrangement as contemplated by the 
section". 
The major advantage of the redeemable preference shares method, from the point 
of view of the offeror, is that it can be implemented without the approval of the Court. 
This will naturally not be the case if the redeemable preference shares method forms 
part of a scheme of arrangement. In such a case Court approval will be required. 
Although a special resolution, requiring approval by 75% of shareholders, is required 
for the conversion of the shares, 225 the expropriated minority members could be 
seriously prejudiced by the exclusion of Court approval. If regard is had to the 
compelling arguments of Katz, 226 as to why the reduction of capital method should 
not be allowed to be used to effect a takeover, then a fortiori the same applies to this 
method of effecting a takeover. Of the different methods discussed to date, the 
222 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
223 At329 
224 At331 
225 In terms of section 75 ( 1) of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
226 M M Katz "Legal aspects of the regulation of take-overs" ( 1979) Modem Business Law 53 
34 
redeemable preference shares method provides the least amount of protection to 
minority shareholders. In section 3 of this dissertation the effect of the Securities 
Regulation Code on Takeovers and Mergers on takeovers, including this method of 
takeover, will be discussed. Section 5 will deal with the desirability of utilising this 
method in the current dispensation. 
2.3.5 Sale of assets method 
In his review of mergers and acquisitions for the period from 1976 to 1980, 
MacGregor 227 lists the purchase of assets as one of the methods utilised by 
companies involved in merger activities. Although only limited use was made of this 
method during the relevant period, the Ernst and Young annual M & A survey for 
1993 indicated that 25% of transactions during 1993 took the form of purchase of 
assets rather than the purchase of shares in the offeree company. 228 
If regard is had to the purpose of a takeover, i.e. gaining control over the net assets 
of a company, the purchase of the assets of a company represents the direct 
method by which a takeover is effected. In their discussion on the forms and legal 
mechanics of takeovers, Weinberg and Blank 229 discuss a number of variations of 
this method. The assets of the offeree company could be bought for cash or in 
exchange for shares in the offeror. A further variation on the theme is the 
acquisition of the assets in the offeree company and the "acquiring company" by a 
third company in exchange for shares in the third company to both the offeree 
company and the "acquiring company". 230 Should the assets in the offeree 
227 I H MacGregor Mergers and Acquisitions in South Africa 1976-1977: A Critical Review(1977) 12 and I H MacGregor 
Mergers and Acquisitions in South Africa 1978- 1980: A Critical Review(1980) 27 
228 Dave Thayser "M & A transactions in SA in 1993" (July 1994) Accountancy SA 20 
229 L Rabinowitz eta/ Weinberg and Blank on Take-overs and Mergers 5th Edition (1989) 2003 
230 L Rabinowitz eta/ Weinberg and Blank on Take-overs and Mergers 5th Edition (1989) 2003 
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company be sold for cash the offeree company is left as a "shell" owning only the 
cash paid by the offeror while the shareholders of the offeree company remain the 
same. 231 
The choice to effect a takeover by means of a purchase of assets is not always 
available to the offeror. When such a choice is available, various considerations 
might play a role in the choice between the two procedures. A discussion of these 
considerations, however, falls beyond the scope of this dissertation. 232 
The statutory requirements for a takeover by means of a sale of assets will be 
discussed in section 4. 
2.3.6 Purchase or exchange of shares 
A company can be taken over by the purchase or exchange of a sufficient number of 
shares in the offeree company to ensure that control is established. This represents 
the most obvious and most frequently used method of effecting a takeover in 
practice. Such a takeover can be accomplished by way of agreement with the 
majority shareholders of the offeree company, by purchasing sufficient shares on the 
stock exchange or by means of a takeover bid. 233 A takeover bid is a "general offer 
made by a person or company to the shareholders of a target company, or to one or 
more classes of its shareholders, to acquire their shares by purchase or exchange of 
shares".234 
231 L Rabinowitz eta/ Weinberg and Blank on Take-overs and Mergers 5th Edition (1989) 2029 
232 For a discussion of these considerations and how they impact upon the choice between the two procedures, see PFC Begg 
Corporate Acquisitions and Mergers :A Practical Guide to the Legal, Financial and Administrative Implications 
3rd Edition (1991) par4.12 and SF Reed eta/ TheArtofM &A: A Merger/Acquisition/BuyoutGuide(1989) 254 
233 W A Joubert(General Editor) The Law of South Africa First Reissue Volume 4 Part 1 (1995) Companies by M S Blackman 
par253 
234 W A Joubert(General Editor) The Law of South Africa First Reissue Volume 4 Part 1 (1995) Companies by M S Blackman 
par253 
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The history of the regulation of takeovers in South Africa will be dealt with in 
section 3. The former and current regulation of a takeover by means of the 
purchase or exchange of shares will therefore be dealt with in the succeeding 
section. 
2.3. 7 Other methods 
Apart from the methods discussed in this section, a number of other methods exist 
by which a takeover can be accomplished. 235 A discussion of these other methods, 
however, falls outside the scope of this dissertation. 
235 See in this regard the discussions in H S Cilliers eta/ Korporatiewe Reg 2nd Edition (1992) 462 and W A Joubert (General 
Editor) TheLawofSouthAfrica First Reissue Volume4 Part 1 (1995) Companies by M S Blackman par 257 
37 
3. REGULATION OF TAKEOVERS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
3.1 Position prior to 1991 
Until the advent of the Companies Act of 1973 236 there were no comprehensive 
statutory provisions governing takeovers and mergers although companies which 
were listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange were subject to the JSE's rules 
and listing requirements and were contractually bound to observe them under 
sanction of suspension of their listing or refusal to list new shares. 237 
Under the Companies Act of 1926 238 two procedures were most frequently used 
when complete control of an offeree company was desired. 239 These procedures 
were: 
• An ordinary offer to purchase the shares in the offeree company followed by a 
compulsory acquisition in terms of section 1 03ter of the 1926 Act; 240 and 
• An offer incorporated in a scheme of arrangement between the offeree company 
and its members in terms of section 103 of the 1926 Act. 241 
No formalities in respect of form or content of the ordinary takeover offer were 
prescribed in the 1926 Act. 242 Neither did the Act 243 prescribe the manner in which 
such an offer must have been made or accepted. 244 According to De Villiers 245 the 
236 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
237 Ed Southey "On the legal scene : Take-overs and Mergers under the Microscope" (June 1990) Accountancy SA 142 
238 Companies Act 46 of 1926 
239 S W L de Villiers "Take-overs under section 311 to 321 of the Companies Act 1973" (1973) SALJ 350 
24° Companies Act 46 of 1926 
241 Companies Act 46 of 1926 
242 Companies Act 46 of 1926 
243 Companies Act 46 of 1926 
244 S W L de Villiers 'Take-overs under section 311 to 321 of the Companies Act 1973" ( 1973) SALJ 351 
245 S W L de Villiers "Take-overs under section 311 to 321 of the Companies Act 1973" ( 1973) SALJ 351 
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offer and acceptance were governed only by the common law of contract. Should 
such an offer be accepted by a "disinterested majority of shareholders, excluding the 
offeror, its nominees and/or subsidiaries, holding 90% in value of the shares of the 
offeree company transfer of which is involved in the takeover'', the offeror was 
entitled to invoke the compulsory acquisition procedure provided for in section 1 03ter 
of the 1926 Act. 246 The offeror could thus acquire the shares of shareholders who 
did not accept the takeover offer through the mechanism of section 1 03ter 247 as 
described above. 248 
Where the offeror did not wish to acquire all the issued share capital of the offeree 
company, he usually proceeded by way of an ordinary general offer to shareholders 
of the offeree company to acquire the percentage which he required. 249 Such a 
partial offer was almost free of any statutory regulation and governed virtually 
entirely by the common law of contract. 250 
In 1963 a Commission of Enquiry into company law was appointed under the 
chairmanship of Mr Justice J van Wyk de Vries. The Commission devoted 
considerable attention to the subject of takeovers in chapter 24 of its Supplementary 
Report. 251 The Commission considered the question of statutory regulation of 
takeovers and came to the conclusion that: 252 
246 Companies Act 46 of 1926 
247 Of Companies Act 46 of 1926 
248 S W L de Villiers "Take-overs under section 311 to 321 of the Companies Act 1973" ( 1973) SALJ 351 
249 S W L de Villiers "Take-overs under section 311 to 321 of the Companies Act 1973" ( 1973) SAW 353 
250 S W L de Villiers 'Take-overs under section 311 to 321 of the Companies Act 1973" ( 1973) SAW 353 
251 S W L de Villiers "Take-overs under section 311 to 321 of the Companies Act 1973" (1973) SAW350 
252 Par 71.04 of the Supplementary Report 
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"Na 'n deeglike ondersoek van die reg en praktyk aangaande oornames en 
met inagneming van die getuienis het die Kommissie tot die slotsom gekom 
dat 'n mate van beheer in die publieke belang noodsaaklik is; soos die reg 
tans staan word onvoldoende voorsiening vir die verlangde beskerming 
gemaak juis waar dit die nodigste is." 
The Commission also came to the conclusion that a system of voluntary self-
discipline, as in the English City Code on Take-overs and Mergers, was not 
practicable in South Africa. 253 As the Commission considered it unwise to try and 
de~~~jJI:t .... ava~:¥ ... circ,lmstance ... that ... CQu!ct ... EIJi~Jt" .ir.t,9Jaka~~.~JtY.~~.9!h •.. J.b~--· 
re9QIDffi~nde<t,UJ.at.a .... b.r.c>,~d ~r.~~~~.:>~.~c:>!J'~r.!nE)~~hQljlc;J ... b~ .. Pr()ViQ~.~J£!f_,tbe. .... 
r~g!,JJation~ot-ti:l~e.QY~t§:. ... ~~ . .., Following the recommend~ of the CommissiQII 
se~~!~ .tC?.}~~-21J!lft£Q.I!lP~Act 255 were enacted. These sections dealt 
with th~~~~~yer offer. 
In so far as schemes of arrangement were concerned, the Commission expressly 
dismissed the suggestion that this procedure was being abused to effect compulsory 
acquisitions, thereby resulting in an avoidance of section 1 03ter. 256 The 
Commission stated: 257 
253 Par 70.04 of the Supplementary Report 
254 Par 75.02 of the Supplementary Report and S W L de Villiers "Take-overs under section 311 to 321 of the Companies Act 
1973" ( 1973) SAW 353 
255 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
256 Of Companies Act 46 of 1926 
257 Par 77.01 of the Supplementary Report 
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"Regtens is die beginsel en die meganisme ingevolge die onderskeie artikels 
geheel en al verskillend en kan hulle nie vergelyk word nie. Elk van die 
artikels het 'n verskillende oogmerk, handel met verskillende beginsels, stel 
verskillende meganismes beskikbaar en be vat verskillende 
beveiligingsmaatreels. Die feit dat dieselfde eindresultaat in kommersiele sin 
in gevolge elk van die artikels bereik kan word, is toevallig en raak nie die 
regsbeginsels nie". 
The Commission therefore clearly intended retaining both the ordinary offer 
procedure as well as the scheme of arrangement procedure to effect takeovers 
where complete control of the offeree company was sought. 258 
Section 314 ( 1 ) of the new Act 259 defined a "takeover offer" as "an offer for the 
acquisition of shares under a takeover scheme". A "takeover scheme" was in tum 
defined as "a scheme involving the making of an offer for acquiring shares of the 
offeree company which, together with any shares of that company already held by 
the offeror, would have the effect either (a) of vesting the control of the offeree 
company directly or indirectly in the offeror or (b) of the offeror acquiring all the 
shares (or all the shares of a particular class) of the offeree company''. 260 The 
definition did not extend to any offer made in the course of any individual negotiation 
with a shareholder for the acquisition of any such shares. 261 
258 S W L de Villiers "Take-overs under section 311 to 321 of the Companies Act 1973" ( 1973) SAW 355 
259 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
260 Section 314 (1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
261 W A Joubert (General Editor) The Law of South Africa First Reissue Volume 4 Part 1 (1995) Companies by M S Blackman 
par258 
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According to LA WSA 262 the definition of "takeover offer'' suffered from a number of 
defects. The first of these defects was that it related only to the "acquisition of 
shares". 263 As was illustrated earlier in section 2 a takeover can be effected in a 
number of ways. Those methods not utilising the acquisition of shares were 
therefore left unregulated, making it possible to circumvent the provisions of section 
314 to 321 of the Companies Act. 264 All that was required was for the offeror to 
obtain the co-operation of the offeree company's board and to utilise the scheme of 
arrangement, the reduction of capital or the redeemable preference share 
method. 265 An illustration of this problem was the judgement in Ex Parte Federale 
Nywerhede Bpk 266 where Coetzee J held that as the proposed scheme did not 
entail an acquisition of shares, section 314 of the Companies Act 267 was not 
applicable. As there was only an extinguishing of shares, the takeover provisions 
did not apply. 268 
Katz 269 was also a proponent of an amended definition of "takeover scheme". He 
was critical of the ''fundamental loophole" of the definition whereby an offeror could 
gain control of a company by private negotiation and thereafter making an offer to all 
shareholders except for one holder of a small number of shares. 270 As both these 
actions fell outside the two tests necessary to constitute a "takeover scheme", the 
offeror could avoid compliance with the provisions of the Act. 271 
262 W A Joubert (General Editor) The Law of South Africa First Reissue Volume 4 Part 1 (1995) Companies by M S Blackman 
par258 
263 W A Joubert (General Editor) TheLawofSouthAfrica First Reissue Volume 4 Part 1 (1995) Companies by M S Blackman 
par258 
264 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
265 W A Joubert(General Editor) The LawofSouthAfrica First Reissue Volume4 Part 1 (1995) Companies by M S Blackman 
par258 
266 1975 (1) SA 826 (W) 
267 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
268 At833 
269 M M Katz "Legal aspects of the regulation of take-overs" ( 1979) Modem Business Law 55 
270 M M Katz "Legal aspects of the regulation of take-overs" (1979) Modern Business Law 55 
271 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
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A further defect in the definition related to the ambit of "control". 272 Indirect 
shareholdings, e.g. shares held by nominees and controlled companies of the 
offeror, were only taken into account in the context of "vesting control", and not in the 
context of the acquisition of all the issued shares of the company or in the case of an 
offer for all the shares of a particular class of the offeree company. 273 It was quite 
possible that in such instances a change of control might not have been involved. 274 
Offers to acquire conversion rights, warrants and options in connection with 
preference shares and debentures and invitations requesting offers from 
shareholders to sell their shares were also left beyond the scope of "control", thus 
making it possible to circumvent the takeover procedures. 275 
The inadequacy of these provisions was highlighted in Spinnaker Investments (pty) 
Ltd v Tongaat Group Ltd. 276 The Court held that the Legislature, in enacting section 
314 to 321, 277 was only dealing with a particular kind of takeover offer. 278 It only 
related to a "composite offer made to the shareholders of the offeree company .... in 
contradistinction to an individual negotiation with a shareholder for the acquisition of 
his shares". 279 Secondly, it only related to a "takeover offer made under a takeover 
scheme, and the scheme must be one which, if implemented, will at the time of 
making the offer have the effect" as defined. 280 If the takeover scheme does not 
involve the making of an offer for shares by the offeror which at the time of making 
the offer will have the prescribed effect, the provisions of section 314 281 will have no 
272 W A Joubert (General Editor) The Law of South Africa First Reissue Volume 4 Part 1 (1995) Companies by M S Blackman 
par 258 
273 S W L de Villiers "Take-overs under sections 311 to 321 of the Companies Act 1973" (1973) SALJ 357 
274 S W L de Villiers "Take-overs under sections 311 to 321 of the Companies Act 1973" (1973) SALJ 357 
275 W A Joubert (General Editor) The Law of South Africa First Reissue Volume 4 Part 1 (1995) Companies by M S Blackman 
par357- 358 
276 1982 (1) SA 65 (A) at 73 
277 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
278 At 73 
279 At 73 
280 At 73 
281 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
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application to the transaction. 282 The Court concluded 283 that "it will be seen that 
two factors are of critical importance : it must be established what the effect of the 
offer will be, and that effect must be ascertained, not at any time, but at the time 
when the offer is made." 
LA iNsA 284 concludes that "the most important criticism against the provisions 
contained in the Companies Act dealing with takeovers was that no provision was 
made for the establishment of a body to administer, make regulations under, and 
enforce the statutory scheme." It must however be stated that even had such a 
body been established, it would have been unlikely to have been successful in light 
of the fatal flaws in the relevant legislation. A total re-examination of present 
legislation was required to deal with this aspect of company law. 
3.2 Introduction of the Securities Regulation Panel 
282 At73 
283 At73 
These problems with the system of takeover regulation led to an investigation by the 
Standing Advisory Committee on Company Law. Their brief was to recommend 
possible reform measures to alleviate these problems. In a memorandum to the 
Committee by Mr Justice C S Margo and F J Naude four options were considered, 
namely: 285 
(i) Detailed and comprehensive statutory provision in the Companies Act; 
(ii) The creation of a governmental agency with rule-making powers; 
284 W A Joubert (General Editor) The Law of South Africa First Reissue Volume 4 Part 1 (1995) Companies by M S Blackman 
par 258 
285 C S Margo and S J Naude "Takeovers and Mergers: The City Panel and the Position in South Africa (Report to the 
Standing Advisory Committee on Company Law)" In Modern Business Law (1983) 122 at 127 
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(iii) Leaving the responsibility with the JSE; 
(iv) The establishment of a Takeover Panel on the basis of self regulation, with or 
without a statutory framework. 
The first option was rejected as "it would impose rigidity which would tend to stultify 
rather than promote the economy." 286 It was felt that it could not cover, ''with the 
essential flexibility'', all situations that may arise in takeovers and mergers. 287 The 
second option was rejected because "the establishment of an effective Securities 
and Exchange Commission [based on the American model] appears to be beyond 
the resources of our country''. 288 The third option was likewise rejected as it was felt 
that an approach, leaving the important area of shareholder protection in takeover 
situations in the hands of a stock exchange, was inappropriate. 289 Such protection 
involves policy decisions on difficult questions and, it was felt, this could not 
reasonably be expected to be "shouldered" by the JSE and its Listings 
Committee. 290 
The Committee thus opted for the fourth option, the establishment of a Takeover 
Panel. 291 They further recommended that such a Panel be established within a 
statutory framework rather than the self regulating model of the London Panel as it 
was felt that completely voluntary self-discipline is not practical in South Africa. 292 
286 C S Margo and S J Naude "Takeovers and Mergers: The City Panel and the Position in South Africa (Report to the 
Standing Advisory Committee on Company Law)" in Modern Business Law (1983) 127 
287 C S Margo and S J Naude "Takeovers and Mergers : The City Panel and the Position in South Africa (Report to the 
Standing Advisory Committee on Company Law)" in Modern Business Law (1983) 127 
288 C S Margo and S J Naude "Takeovers and Mergers : The City Panel and the Position in South Africa (Report to the 
Standing Advisory Committee on Company Law)" in Modern Business Law (1983) 128 
289 C S Margo and S J Naude "Takeovers and Mergers : The City Panel and the Position in South Africa (Report to the 
Standing Advisory Committee on Company Law)" in Modern Business Law (1983) 129 
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Following the recommendations of the Standing Advisory Committee on Company 
Law sections 314 to 321 293 as well as section 224, 294 which prohibited directors 
from dealing in options in respect of listed shares and debentures, and sections 229 
to 233, 295 dealing with insider trading, were repealed. 296 These provisions were 
replaced by a new chapter 297 in the Companies Act, entitled "Regulation of 
Securities". The new chapter XVA was inserted by section 4 (a) of the Companies 
Amendment Act. 298 
Section 4408(1) of the Companies Act 299 established the Securities Regulation 
Panel. The Panel is a body corporate with members appointed by the Minister. 300 
Section 4408(2) 301 determines who must be included within the ranks of these 
members. The function of the Panel is to regulate "affected transactions" or 
proposals that will, if completed, be "affected transactions". 302 In terms of section 
440C(1)(b) it also supervises dealings in "securities", as defined in section 440A. 303 
In terms of Section 440C(3) 304 the Panel is empowered to make rules for the 
regulation of "affected transactions". The chapter further contains a prohibition 
against insider trading. 305 
293 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
294 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
295 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
296 In terms of section 6 of the Companies Amendment Act 78 of 1989 
297 Chapter XV A 
298 Companies Act 78 of 1989 
299 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
300 Section 4408 (1) and (2) 
301 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
302 Section 440C (1)(a) 
303 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
304 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
305 Section 440F 
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The provisions of chapter XVA 306 were amended by the Companies Second 
Amendment Act of 1990. 307 A provision prohibiting a person from entering into an 
"affected transaction", as defined in section 440A, 308 except in accordance with the 
rules was inter alia introduced by the Amendment Act. 309 This prohibition was 
contained in the new section 440L 310• Section 440M 31 1, in tum, empowered the 
Panel to apply to Court to obtain certain specified remedies where a person who is 
not exempted from the rules contravenes or threatens to contravene them. A new 
provision 312 prohibiting insider trading and a provision empowering the Panel to 
require certain holders of equity securities to make disclosure to it of such holdings 
were also inserted. 313 Section 440K 314 re-introduced the compulsory acquisition 
provisions, suitably amended, to the Companies Act. 315 
3.3 Securities Regulation Code 
The Securities Regulation Panel compiled the Securities Regulation Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers under section 440C (3) and (4) of the Companies Act. 316 
The Code was promulgated on 18 January 1991. 317 In terms of Rule 36.1 the Code 
applies to "affected transactions" entered into with effect from 1 February 1991. 
306 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
307 Companies Act 69 of 1990 
308 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
309 Companies Act 69 of 1990 
310 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
311 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
312 Section 440F 
313 Section 440G 
314 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
315 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
316 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
317 In terms of GNR 29 in Government Gazette No 12962 
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According to the Explanatory Notes to the Code 318 the Code is based on the City 
Code on Takeovers and Mergers issued by the London Panel on Takeovers and 
Mergers. Its purpose is to ensure that all holders of relevant securities affected by a 
takeover or merger are treated fairly and equally. 319 The principle of self regulation 
by the securities industry finds expression in the Code, which in South Africa, unlike 
the position in England, enjoys the force of law. 320 This is clear from section 1(c) of 
the Code - Enforcement of the Code which refers to the statutory powers of the 
Panel to enforce the Code. 
The Code is divided into general principles, setting out acceptable standards of 
commercial behaviour, and rules, containing examples of the application of the 
general principles as well as the procedural requirements to be followed. 321 The 
general principles endeavour to embody the principle of equality of treatment of all 
holders of the same class of securities by requiring the furnishing of all information 
necessary to ensure equality of information, 322 a careful and responsible 
consideration of announcements of offers or announcements of an intention to make 
an offer and preparation of documents and advertisements, 323 the supply of 
sufficient information and advice, and the granting of sufficient time to enable an 
informed decision to be made. 324 It also requires the avoidance of the creation of 
false markets, 325 the prohibition of the frustration of bona fide offers, 326 and the 
oppression of minorities, 327 as well as requiring the disregard of directors' personal 
interests when advising the holders of relevant securities. 328 The Code further 
318 Section 1 (a) of the Code- Nature and Purpose of the Code 
319 Section 1 (a) of the Code- Nature and Purpose of the Code 
320 Section 1 (c) of the Code - Enforcement of the Code 
321 Section A - Introduction, Par 2 - The Code in Practice 
322 General Principle 1 and 2 in section C of the Code 
323 General Principle 3 and 5 in section C of the Code 
324 General Principle 4 in section C of the Code 
325 General Principle 6 in section C of the Code 
326 General Principle 7 in section C of the Code 
327 General Principle 8 in section C of the Code 
328 General Principle 9 in section C of the Code 
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requires the offeror in an "affected transaction" to make an identical offer (or where 
this is not possible, an equivalent cash offer) to acquire the securities of those 
holders of relevant securities who were not involved in the "affected transaction". 329 
The Companies Act 330 empowers the Panel to enforce its rules by application to 
Court for an order for specific performance and/or for an interdict and/or for a 
declaratory order. 331 Section 1 (c) - Enforcement of the Code in the Explanatory 
Notes further provides that the Panel can enforce the Code "by notification to 
interested parties and/or by general publication of an announcement that the 
requirements of the Code have not been complied with and/or that a particular offer 
is not or was not valid, with the consequences flowing therefrom". 
3.4 Transactions and companies to which the Code apply 
Subject to any exemption by the Panel, no person may enter into or propose an 
"affected transaction" except in accordance with the rules made or amended from 
time to time by the Securities Regulation Panel. 332 An "affected transaction" is 
defined 333 as "any transaction (including a transaction which forms part of a series 
of transactions) or scheme, whatever form it may take, which : 
a. taking into account any securities held before such transaction or 
scheme, has or will have the effect of : 
(i) vesting control of any company (excluding a dose corporation) 
in any person, or two or more persons acting in concert, in 
329 General Principle 10 in section C of the Code 
330 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
331 Section 440M of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
332 Section 440L of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
333 Section 440A ( 1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
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whom control did not vest prior to such transaction or scheme; 
or 
(ii) any person, or two or more persons acting in concert, 
acquiring, or becoming the sole holder or holders of, all the 
securities, or all the securities of a particular class, of any 
company (excluding a close corporation); or 
b. involved the acquisition by any person, or two or more persons acting 
in concert, in whom control of any company (excluding a close 
corporation) vests on or after the date of commencement 334 of section 
1 (c) of the Companies Second Amendment Act, 1990, of further 
securities of that company in excess of the limits prescribed in the 
rules." 
In turn, "control" means "a holding or aggregate holdings of shares or other 
securities in a company entitling the holder to exercise, or cause to be exercised, the 
specified percentage or more of the voting rights at meetings of that company, 
irrespective of whether such holding or holdings confer de facto control." 335 
"Specified percentage" is the percentage prescribed in the rules for the purposes of 
determining control. 336 The specified percentage may in no case fall below 20% of 
the issued securities of any class. 337 In terms of paragraph 5 of section B -
Definitions of the Code the original specified percentage was established at 30% or 
more of the voting rights of a company. The specified percentage is at present 35% 
or more of the voting rights of a company. 338 
334 1 February 1991 
335 Section 440A ( 1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
336 Section 440A (1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
337 Section 440A (1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
338 Government Gazette 15050 R1522 of 13 August 1993. 
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The above definition of an "affected transaction" refers to the concept of persons 
"acting in concert". Section 440A (2) (a) 339 contains certain deeming provisions as 
to when persons are deemed to be "acting in concert". 
It is the nature of the company "which is the offeree or potential offeree or in which 
control (as defined) may change" that determines whether or not the Securities 
Regulation Code on Takeovers and Mergers applies. 340 The Code applies where 
the offeree company is a "public company, whether or not listed on the Stock 
Exchange, or a statutory corporation, which is or is deemed to be resident in the 
Republic". 341 The Code also applies where the offeree company is a "private 
company which is or which is deemed to be resident in the Republic but only where 
the shareholders' interests, valued at the offer price, and the shareholders' loan 
capital, exceed R5 million and there are more than 10 beneficial shareholders". 342 
Rule 34 of the Code empowers the Panel to "authorise, subject to such terms and 
conditions as it may prescribe, non-compliance with or departure from any 
requirement of the Code and to excuse or exonerate any party from failure to comply 
with any such requirement." 
Based on the above exposition it is clear that the establishment of the Securities 
Regulation Panel was aimed at the regulation of mergers and takeovers and the 
protection of all holders of relevant securities. This protection is, however, only 
available if the relevant transaction qualifies as an "affected transaction", as defined 
in section 440A. 343 
339 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
340 Par 3 - Companies To Which The Code Applies of Section A - Introduction of the Code 
341 Par 3 - Companies To Which The Code Applies of Section A- Introduction of the Code 
342 Par 3- Companies To Which The Code Applies of Section A- Introduction of the Code 
343 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
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3.5 Effect of the Code on methods of achieving a takeover 
The Code has not only significantly altered the regulation of takeovers effected by 
means of a purchase or exchange of shares. It has also had a significant effect on 
takeovers effected by the scheme of arrangement, reduction of capital and 
redeemable preference shares methods. Rule 29 (a) (iv) reads as follows: 
"(a) Where an offer is implemented by a scheme of arrangement or by a 
reduction of capital or conversion of securities or any other method, 
then, for the purposes of these Rules-... 
(iv) save in so far as the Panel may otherwise permit, or unless 
the Supreme Court has ordered otherwise, the provisions of 
these Rules relating to the disclosure and, where possible, 
timing and periods of notice shall apply mutatis mutandis." 
From the above it is evident that the extensive provisions of the Code, as inter alia 
enunciated in paragraph 3.3, 344 relating to compulsory disclosure requirements, 
providing adequate time to consider offers and related matters are also made 
applicable to the scheme of arrangement, reduction of capital and redeemable 
preference shares methods to effect a takeover. By including these methods of 
effecting takeovers within the ambit of the Code, the Legislature has made its 
intention clear that shareholder protection must be statutorily entrenched irrespective 
of the method chosen to effect a takeover. The power of the Court and the Panel to 
allow a deviation from the provisions of the Code is, however, retained. It is 
344 See e.g. Rule 2, 3, 6, 7, 14, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 30, 32 
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submitted that very good cause will have to be shown by the proponent of such a 
deviation before a Court or the Panel will make such an order. 
The effect of Rule 29 of the Code on these methods is that the Panel will police the 
Code and ensure that all its provisions are adhered to by parties to a takeover. 
Where necessary, the Panel may approach the Court to enforce the provisions of 
the Code. On the other hand, the Court still retains its role in sanctioning the 
relevant scheme of arrangement or reduction of capital in terms of section 311 and 
84 of the Companies Act. 345 The Court therefore retains its role in shareholder 
protection as it still has the discretion to refuse an application to sanction a scheme 
of arrangement or reduction of capital. The Court must still determine whether the 
provisions of section 311 or 84 of the Companies Act 346 have been adhered to by 
the parties to the proposed takeover. It is submitted that the Court will also refuse 
an application to sanction a scheme of arrangement or reduction of capital if the 
provisions of the Code have not been complied with. The Panel and the Court are 
therefore partners in shareholder protection during takeovers. 
Rule 29(b) of the Code further states that "in the case of a reduction of capital or a 
conversion of securities which has as its purpose the elimination of a minority 
shareholding, the Panel may in appropriate circumstances require that at the 
relevant meetings the majority votes shall be excluded." Unfortunately the Code 
does not give any indication as to what would constitute "appropriate 
circumstances." What is significant, however, is that the Panel is given the power to 
exclude the votes of a majority where the purpose of the reduction of capital or 
conversion of securities is to eliminate minority shareholdings. 
345 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
346 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
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The introduction of Rule 29(b) of the Code raises a number of pertinent questions. 
These questions include the following : 
• What is the "relevant meeting"? 
• What is meant by "majority votes"? Whose votes will be excluded? 
• Will the exclusion be dealt with in the same way as in section 440K(1 )? 347 
• Why have schemes of arrangement been excluded from this Rule? 
• How will the exclusion of majority votes affect the passing of the required special 
resolution? 
The above questions currently remain unanswered and it is submitted that legislative 
amendment is required to clarify these issues. No answers are readily available 
and, should the interpretation of this Rule be left to the Courts, it is submitted that 
the role and ambit of Rule 29 of the Code could be shrouded in uncertainty. 
It is submitted that this power of the Panel to exclude the majority votes should be 
exercised sparingly so as not to create a veto right for minorities as there are often 
sound commercial reasons for a takeover. What must be kept in mind is that section 
252 of the Companies Act 348 is still available to minority shareholders to protect their 
interests and to prevent undue oppression of minorities. In terms of section 252 349 
the Court has a very wide discretion to make any suitable order to prevent 
oppression of minority shareholders. On the other hand, it will be conceded that the 
Panel, representing the collective opinion and standards of the securities industry, is 
often better positioned than a Court to determine what constitutes acceptable 
347 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
348 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
349 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
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behaviour on the side of majority shareholders during a takeover. In view of this fact 
this provision in the Code is welcomed as another tool in the interest of minority 
protection. 
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4. EXCLUSION OF ASSET TAKEOVERS FROM THE DEFINITION OF "AFFECTED 
TRANSACTION" 
4.1 Introduction 
In 1980 MacGregor 350 expressed criticism against the anomalous position that the 
same protection was not afforded to all shareholders irrespective of the method 
employed to effect a takeover. The Legislature attempted to remedy this problem 
with the introduction of the Securities Regulation Panel and Code. As explained 
above, all "affected transactions" 351 are included within the ambit of the Code. 
"Affected transaction" is defined in the Act as "any transaction or scheme, whatever 
form it may take 352 ... ". 353 The intention was clearly to bring neutrality of treatment 
whatever method is employed to effect a takeover. However, a transaction can only 
be an "affected transaction" if it relates to "securities". 354 A "security'' is defined in 
section 440A (1) of the Companies Act 355 as meaning "any shares in the capital of a 
company and includes stock and debentures convertible into shares and any rights 
or interests in a company or in respect of any shares, stock or debentures, and 
includes any "financial instrument" as defined in the Financial Markets Control Act, 
1989". A takeover by means of the purchase of assets is therefore not included. 
350 I H MacGregor Mergers and Acquisitions in South Africa 1978- 1980 :A Critical Review(1980) 28 
351 As defined in section 440A of Act 61 of 1973 
352 My emphasis 
353 Section 440A (1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
354 In terms of the definition of "affected transaction" in section 440A ( 1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
355 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
56 
4.2 Section 228 of the Companies Act 
A disposal of assets by a company is regulated by section 228 of the Companies 
Act 356 if the requirements of the section, relating to the portion of the assets being 
alienated, are met. It is therefore important to look at the nature and purpose of this 
section. 
Section 228 of the Companies Act 357 determines that "notwithstanding anything 
contained in the memorandum or articles, the directors of a company shall not have 
the power, save with the approval of a general meeting, to dispose of (a) the whole 
or substantially the whole of the undertaking of the company, or (b) the whole or the 
greater part of the assets of the company''. In order to be effective the resolution 
approving such disposal must specifically authorise or ratify the transaction in 
question. 358 Section 228 of the Act 359 therefore imposes a limitation not on the 
capacity of a company but on the authority of the directors. 360 
In Levy v Zalrut Investments 361 the Court had an opportunity to pronounce upon the 
nature of section 228. 362 It was stated that: 363 
"The intention of the Legislature in enacting section 228 was to place a 
limitation on the powers of the directors of a company in respect of the 
disposal of the whole or major portion of its undertaking or assets and was 
356 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
357 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
358 Section 228 (2) of Act 61 of 1973 
359 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
360 P E J Brooks "Section 228 of the Companies Acf' (May 1987) THRHR 226 
361 1986(4)SA479(W) 
362 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
363 At 484 - 485 
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introduced with a view to regulating the procedure required for a disposal 
described therein and as such it was clearly designed for the benefit of the 
shareholders." 
The purpose of section 228 of the Companies Act 364 is the protection of 
shareholders of a company against potential alienation of company assets by the 
directors of the company. 365 Unlimited alienation of assets will not only change the 
nature of the company but may also place the company in a position where it is 
unable to continue trading. 366 The intention of the Legislature to provide statutory 
protection to shareholders by means of section 228 367 also emerges clearly from 
earlier decisions such as Sugden v Beaconhurst Dairies (Pty) Ltd 368 where it was 
stated that "its purpose ... was to secure a measure of protection for shareholders". 
A great deal of criticism has been levelled at section 228 369 and calls have been 
voiced for the removal of section 228 from the Act. 370 The most serious criticism of 
the section is the invidious position of a third party who may suffer prejudice as a 
result of the operation of a provision designed for the protection of shareholders. 371 
This has led to a recommendation in the Minority Report 372 of the Van Wyk De Vries 
Commission 373 that the predecessor of section 228, 374 section 70dec (2}, 375 be 
364 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
365 Michele von Willich "Die Uitwerklng van Artikel228 van die Maatskappywet 61 van 1973 op die Turquand-reel" (March 
1988) Modern Business Law 12 
366 Michele von Willich "Die Uitwerking van Artikel 228 van die Maatskappywet 61 van 1973 op die Turquand-reel" (March 
1988) Modern Business Law 12 
367 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
368 1963 (2) SA 174 (D at 179 
369 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
37
° Companies Act 61 of 1973; See e.g. Ribbens "Disposal of the Undertaking or the Whole or Greater Part of the Assets of a 
Company" (1976) THRHR 169; Hodes "Disposal of Assets" (1978) SACLJ F-14; Von Willich "Die uitwerklng van Artikel228 
van die Maatskappywet 61 van 1973 op die Turquand-reel" (1988) Modern Business Law 14. 
371 Michele von Willich "Die Uitwerking van Artikel228 van die Maatskappywet 61 van 1973 op die Turquand-reel" (March 
1988) Modern Business Law 12 
372 Annexure C par 9.60 
373 Main Report RP 45/1970 
374 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
375 Of Companies Act 46 of 1926 
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scrapped. The objection to section 228, 376 according to its critics, is that it is unfair 
towards a third party to nullify an agreement of sale between such a third party and 
the directors of a company based on the fact that the necessary section 228 377 
approval has not been obtained. It is argued that there should be no duty on a bona 
fide third party to establish whether the necessary resolution had been passed by 
the company. A discussion of this aspect of section 228 378 and the relationship of 
section 228 379 with the Turquand rule, however, falls beyond the scope of this 
discussion. 380 What should be kept in mind is that a lobby exists for the removal of 
section 228 381 which would result in an even more detrimental situation for minority 
shareholders in the case of takeovers by means of asset purchases vis-a-vis other 
forms of takeover. 
The question needs to be answered whether it is advisable that a section 228 382 
sale of assets be included in the definition of an "affected transaction", thus making 
the Code applicable to such transactions. This question needs to be answered 
saf~g_IJards for n:linorities. It must be kept in mind that protection is a form of 
interference with free market forces. 383 The question whether controlling 
shareholders should be allowed tp e}<groociate minoritie~ .!_h!o~qtL.9n~l~!!~ 
was considered in the cases of the expropriation of minority shareholders in Micor 
---~ .. ~·""·"'""-''•.._,,...,__,,;;.,=_.,, .. ;,,.._,..,.'"""""'-~1_,<'-.,_~A.-~•"'·-"·- ••' "''-"""._'"'''-' ..... ,."J>..il/i: 
and Racy, two public companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, in 
1993. 384 
376 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
377 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
378 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
379 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
380 For a further discussion on this relationship, see Michele von Willich "Die Uitwerking van Artikel 228 van die 
Maatskappywet 61 van 1973 op die Turquand-reel" (March 1988) Modem Business Law 12 
381 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
382 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
383 Ann Crotty "Minority Close-out: Protection needed for an endangered species" (14 January 1993) Finance Week 36 
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The expropriation transaction was implemented by way of section 228 of the 
Companies Act. 385 The assets of the company were sold, converting the company 
into a cash shell. As the shares were not sold, but the assets, this transaction did 
not fall within the ambit of the Code. 386 Given the position of the controlling 
shareholders in Racy and Micor, inter alia that their public profile was of little value to 
them, and public criticism was therefore not a major concern, utilising the section 
228 387 procedure seemed to be understandable. 388 It represented a method of 
takeover which was time and cost effective. 389 However, it is difficult to condone the 
manner in which minority shareholders were expropriated from the business of 
Racy. 390 
According to Crotty 391 the general feeling in the market was that this sort of use of 
section 228 392 represented a complete abuse of minority rights. The more so when, 
as in Racy's and Micor's case, the directors who were selling the businesses were 
also directors of the buying companies involved. As section 228 393 was used, the 
only remedy open to these minorities was an application in terms of section 252 of 
the Companies Act 394 as both the JSE and the Securities Regulation Panel, which 
would normally be responsible for the protection of minority rights, had no authority 
to intervene. 
385 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
386 Ann Crotty "Minority Close-out: Protection needed for an endangered species" (14 January 1993) Finance Week 36 
387 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
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None of the majority shareholders were contravening any of the JSE's listing 
requirements, and in terms of the Securities Regulation Code the transaction could 
not be defined as an "affected transaction" as there was no sale of securities and 
therefore fell outside the jurisdiction of the Panel. In terms of section 252 of the 
Companies Act 395 a shareholder may approach the Court for assistance if "any 
particular act or omission of a company is unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable". 
Section 252 396 was primarily designed to protect minority shareholders from 
oppression by majority shareholders. However, according to Crotty, the risk, time 
and cost involved have resulted in section 252 397 not often being used by minority 
shareholders. 398 Whether section 252 399 constitutes a sufficient remedy to minority 
shareholders will be reverted to later on. 
It is for these reasons that the use of section 228 400 is an attractive option to 
majority shareholders. Implementing a takeover by means of the section 228 401 
procedure does not constitute an "affected transaction", neither does this procedure 
contravene any JSE listing requirement. 
As a number of companies were considering following the example of Racy and 
Micor, the JSE, the Securities Regulation Panel and the Standing Advisory 
Committee on Company Law were looking for a way either to prevent this use of 
section 228 402 or bring it under the jurisdiction of the Panel. 403 
395 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
396 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
397 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
398 Ann Crotty "Minority Close-out: Protection needed for an endangered species" (14 January 1993) Finance Week 37 
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4.3 Recommendation by the SAC 
In terms of Rule 29 of the Securities Regulation Code the Code applies whether an 
offer 404 is implemented by a scheme of arrangement or by a reduction of capital or 
conversion of securities or any other method. Section 440L 405 also determines that 
"subject to any exemption by the Panel, no person shall enter into or propose an 
"affected transaction" except in accordance with the rules." However, as Larkin 406 
correctly points out, Rule 29 cannot cure the Panel's lack of jurisdiction over an 
acquisition of the assets of the offeree company. There is no statutory sanction for 
such jurisdiction and one cannot cure this by resort to the "spirit" of the Code. 407 
This statement is in fact not disproved by the ABSA takeover of the Allied Group as 
that transaction, correctly construed, did not involve only an assets acquisition. 408 
According to Larkin 409 fears have been expressed that the two worlds which the 
new securities legislation seeks to straddle, i.e. statutory regulation and self 
regulation, are too far apart for this to be able to be done successfully. This problem 
is illustrated by the fact that the Panel has not been empowered to have authority in 
a situation where a company's assets are taken over rather than its shares. 410 
404 Defined in section B of the Code as including "an offer in respect of an affected transaction, however effected". 
405 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
406 M P Larkin "Company Law Legislation" ( 1991) Annual SuNey of South African Law 212 
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Durtng 1993 the Standing Advisory Committee on Company l~~~ 
recommended to the Minister of Finance and of Trade and Industry that the 
Companies Act 411 be amended to include in the definition of an "affected 
transaction": 
"a disposal which is governed by section 228 of the [Companies] Act where 
the purchaser is unrelated to the seller''. 412 
The ratio behind the SAC's recommendation was the protection of minority 
shareholders. The current exclusion of a disposal of assets in terms of section 228 
of the Companies Act 413 is one reason why there is no "neutrality of treatment in 
respect of all corporate combinations". 414 It was the view of the SAC that it was 
necessary to include such a section 228 415 disposal within the definition of "affected 
transaction" to ensure such neutrality of treatment by also bringing this method 
within the ambit of the Securities Regulation Code on Takeovers and Mergers. 416 
411 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
412 J A K Jarvis "Protection for Minority Shareholders - Section 228 of the Companies Act - Recommendations by the Standing 
Advisory Committee on Company Law" (June 1993) De Rebus 481 
413 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
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4.4 Conceptual problems with SAC recommendation 
According to Jarvis 417 there are two aspects of the recommendation by the SAC 
which require comment. The first relates to the determination of which of the 
transactions governed by the provisions of section 228 418 should be incorporated in 
the definition of an "affected transaction". The second relates to the requirements of 
the Code and the powers of the Panel in relation to a transaction governed by 
section 228 419 which falls in the definition of an "affected transaction". 420 
In relation to the first aspect, the SAC recommendation is to include a disposal which 
is governed by section 228 of the Act 421 where "the purchaser is unrelated 422 to the 
seller''. As Jarvis 423 correctly points out, the reference to unrelated purchasers and 
sellers is presumably an error. It is not clear why the relationship between unrelated 
purchasers and sellers should be regulated. 424 The intention was probably to refer 
to related parties. 425 
417 J A K Jarvis "Protection of Minority Shareholders. Section 228 of the Companies Act- Recommendation by the Standing 
Advisory Committee on Company Law• (June 1993) De Rebus at 482 
418 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
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The emphasis on the relationship between purchaser and seller (i.e. the selling 
company) is in any event misplaced. 426 The relationship between the controlling 
shareholders of the seller and the purchaser is of far greater significance. 427 The 
concept of "control", as envisaged by section 440A of the Companies Act 428 and in 
the Code, could also be used to measure the relationship between the purchaser 
and seller where the purchaser is a company. 429 However, the current concept of 
"control" does not lend itself to be utilised where the purchaser is not a company as 
there is no shareholding to measure control. 430 In these cases the existing concept 
of "control" needs to be expanded to beyond a specified shareholding. This could ....____ 
prove to be the source of.~gme difficulty. 431 By way of illustration, Jarvis 432 uses 
• ,~ ' -· •• .,,._,,,,.,ht~"'--"""'''' 
the example of a partnership comprising 1 0 people with one of those partners being 
the controlling shareholder of the selling company. The question is then asked 
whether the acquisition by the partnership would fall within the definition of an 
"affected transaction" due to the fact that each partner has control of the partnership 
by virtue of the common law right of every partner to bind the partnership. 433 The 
reason why such a transaction would then be an "affected transaction" is that one 
person, the relevant partner, is the controller of both the selling company and the 
purchasing partnership. 
426 J A K Jarvis "Protection of Minority Shareholders - Section 228 of the Companies Act - Recommendation by the Standing 
Advisory Committee on Company Law" (June 1993) De Rebus at 482 
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Similar questions would arise in relation to close corporation purchasers. Unless the 
members have agreed otherwise in terms of an association agreement, section 54 of 
the Close Corporations Act 434 determines that all members of the close corporation 
have the power to bind the corporation. Again the question could be raised whether 
an acquisition by the close corporation would be termed an "affected transaction" if a 
member of the close corporation is also a controlling shareholder of the selling 
company. Again, one person is the controller of both the purchasing close 
corporation and the selling company. 
Once the problem of determining whether a section 228 435 disposal constitutes an 
"affected transaction" has been overcome, the next question that needs to be 
answered is what should be done once such a disposal has been classified as an 
"affected transaction". 436 The difficulty is namely that the Code provides for a 
remedy which makes it obligatory for the offeror to purchase the shares of 
shareholders in the offeree company other than those involved in the acquisition of 
control. 437 The problem is exacerbated by section 440C (2) of the Act 438 which 
makes it clear that the Panel has no jurisdiction to judge "the commercial 
advantages and disadvantages of an affected transaction". No commercial 
judgement is thus made by the Panel in regulating the extension of an equivalent 
offer to minority shareholders. 439 
434 Companies Act 69 of 1984 
435 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
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Where a disposal of assets by a company becomes an "affected transaction", 440 
however, what would be expected of the Code and Panel? Jarvis 441 asks the 
question whether rules are to be incorporated requiring the Panel to require the 
purchaser of the assets of the selling company to extend an offer to purchase 
shares in the selling company? He answers 442 that if this is the case, presumably 
the offer will be limited to those shareholders of the selling company who do not 
have control of the purchaser. And if this problem can be overcome, at what price 
will the offer for shares be made? The problem is namely that there is no existing 
offer to the majority shareholders that could simply be made applicable to the 
minority shareholders. No price has yet been established for the shares of the 
company and the Panel will have to fix a fair price to protect the interests of the 
minority shareholders. This will constitute a commercial judgement. 443 
Should the offeror, who has bought the company assets at fair value, be obliged to 
also offer to buy the shares of the minority, this would mean that he would probably 
pay more than the net asset value of the company. This, in turn, might be unfair 
towards the offeror unless this fact is discounted when establishing the price of the 
assets, a possibility fraught with difficulty. 
It must be reiterated that the Panel is not empowered to judge the "commercial 
advantages and disadvantages" of a proposed transaction. 444• Added to this lack of 
jurisdiction is the practical problem that the Panel does not have the necessary staff 
or qualified resources to carry out such a commercial judgement. This problem 
440 As defined in section 440A ( 1) of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
441 J A K Jarvis "Protection of Minority Shareholders- Section 228 of the Companies Act- Recommendation by the Standing 
Advisory Committee on Company Law" (June 1993) De Rebus at 482 
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could in theory be overcome by outsourcing this aspect to consultants. This would 
of necessity have cost implications and would also require an amendment to the 
current rules. 
Even if the possible solution of outsourcing, with a concomitant amendment to the 
rules, is accepted, this would require the Panel to make economic judgements and 
thereby enter the economic arena. 445 This was never the intention in establishing 
the Panel. 446 The question therefore needs to be asked whether, as a matter of 
policy, the Panel should enter this arena. 
In an article in the Financial Mail 447 it was pointed out that the inclusion of section 
228 448 disposals within the definition of an "affected transaction" would mean that 
the Securities Regulation Panel could become involved in making commercial 
judgements also about the price at which company assets are sold or purchased 
which is an area "dangerously akin to a regulatory minefield." 449 
It is submitted that the answer to this problem can be found in the judgement of 
Vermooten J in Investors Mutual Funds Limited v Empisal (South Africa) Limited. 450 
In this case the minority shareholders of Empisal sought to interdict the holding of a 
meeting of the company where a resolution in terms of section 228 of the 
Companies Act, 451 authorising the sale of the company's assets, was to be passed 
by the majority of shareholders. 452 Relying on section 252, 453 the minority 
445 J A K Jarvis "Protection of Minority Shareholders - Section 228 of the Companies Act - Recommendation by the Standing 
Advisory Committee on Company Law" (June 1993) De Rebus at 482 
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shareholders contended that the sale of the assets was unfairly prejudicial to them. 
The Court held 454 that section 252 455 contained no provision empowering the Court 
to interfere with the ordinary running of the business of the company by its directors 
or controlling shareholders. 
It was further held 456 that section 252 457 related to something already done and not 
to something to be done in the future, but that, if a transaction was subsequently 
found to be unfairly prejudicial to the minority shareholders, the appropriate remedy 
would be for the Court to order the purchase of the shares of the minority either by 
the controlling shareholders or by the company at a price which may be fixed by the 
Court. In such event the minority shareholders could not be "locked in". 458 The 
objecting minority shareholders are therefore not obliged to accept the oppressive 
actions of the majority. 459 Section 252 460 provides them with a remedy to counter 
the actions of the majority and, if necessary, to force the majority shareholders to 
buy the shares of the minority shareholders. 461 Thus, if unfair prejudice is proved, a 
similar result is reached as that contemplated by the Code in the case of a takeover 
and a subsequent offer to minority shareholders. 
In the course of his judgement Vermooten J came to a number of important 
conclusions. The minority shareholders contended 462 that the transaction was 
unbusinesslike and that the effect of the transaction would be to convert Empisal 
from a trading concern to a company owning only cash, with a consequent reduction 
454 At 177 
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of profit, in which the objecting minority would be locked in. However, Vermooten J 
concluded 463 that the transaction was not unfairly prejudicial to the minority 
shareholders. The learned Judge stated 464 that they were not being treated any 
differently from the majority shareholders. There has therefore been no 
discrimination whatsoever between the majority and minority shareholders. 465 It 
must be stated, however, that the criteria for establishing unfair prejudice are not 
limited to whether the majority and minority shareholders were treated in the same 
way. Even though they may have been treated in the same way, the effect of the 
treatment could be discriminatory between the two classes of shareholders. This 
issue was not dealt with in the course of the judgement. 
Vermooten J again stated 466 the fundamental principle of company law that majority 
rule prevails subject to certain exceptions. Such exceptions include the cases where 
a 75% majority is required as well as confirmation by the Court as in the case of a 
scheme of arrangement under section 311. 467 The principles stated in this 
judgement will be reverted to later. 
Jarvis 468 suggests that protection of minorities should be sought by means other 
than bringing transactions requiring a section 228 469 approval within the rules of the 
Code and under the supervision of the Panel. He favours the law as it stands since 
any oppressed shareholder has a right of recourse in terms of section 252 of the 
Act 470 which gives the Court extremely wide powers in circumstances where there is 
463 At 175 
464 At 175 
465 At 175 
466 At 175 
467 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
468 J A K Jarvis "Protection of Minority Shareholders - Section 228 of the Companies Act - Recommendation by the Standing 
Advisory Committee on Company Law" (June 1993) De Rebus at482 
469 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
47° Companies Act 61 qf 1973 
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oppression or unfairness to any one or more shareholders. 471 He finds it difficult to 
understand why greater protection should be given to a minority shareholder than for 
example a land owner who feels that his rights have been infringed by his 
neighbour. 472 Such a land owner is obliged to seek the protection of the Court to 
ensure his rights. Similar considerations surely apply to minority shareholders 
according to Jarvis. 473 
However, although there is some merit in Jarvis' contentions, there should be 
neutrality of treatment of minority shareholders irrespective of the method of 
takeover employed. The question should therefore be posed whether minority 
shareholders in an asset takeover, as opposed to a takeover regulated by the 
Securities Regulation Code, are treated equally. This question must surely be 
answered in the negative. As was clearly illustrated in the Micor and Racy cases, 
majority shareholders can expropriate minorities by way of the section 228 474 
\ 
procedure with impunity. Although this possibility also exists in the case of an 
"affected transaction", far better safeguards are in place to ensure fair treatment of 
minority shareholders. In the case of the section 228 475 procedure there are very 
few procedural requirements which the majority shareholders need to adhere to. All 
that is required is a resolution as provided by section 228 of the Act. 476 On the 
opposite side of the scale, "affected transactions" are extensively regulated in terms 
of the Code. These provisions are also policed by the Panel to ensure fair treatment 
471 J A K Jarvis "Protection of Minority Shareholders- Section 228 of the Companies Act- Recommendation by the Standing 
Advisory Committee on Company Law" (June 1993) De Rebus at482 
472 J A K Jarvis "Protection of Minority Shareholders - Section 228 of the Companies Act - Recommendation by the Standing 
Advisory Committee on Company Law" (June 1993) De Rebus at 482 - 483 
473 J A K Jarvis "Protection of Minority Shareholders - Section 228 of the Companies Act - Recommendation by the Standing 
Advisory Committee on Company Law" (June 1993) De Rebus at 482-483 
474 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
475 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
476 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
71 
of minority shareholders in accordance with the general principles and rules of the 
Code. Unlike the position under section 228, 477 in the case of minority protection 
afforded by the Code this protection is provided to minority shareholders ipso facto 
and no action is required from such minority shareholders. 
477 Of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
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5. CONCLUSION 
It was earlier stated that, on policy grounds, it is undesirable that different levels of 
minority shareholder protection are applicable depending on the method chosen to 
effect a takeover. For many years the de facto position in South Africa has been 
that the level of protection afforded to minority shareholders depended on the 
chosen method of the offeror in a takeover. The criticism against this position has 
not gone unheard and the Legislature has gone some way to addressing this 
problem. By including Rule 29 in the Code, greater neutrality has been achieved in 
the treatment of minority shareholders. Utilising the scheme of arrangement, 
reduction of capital or conversion of securities procedures no longer exempts the 
offeror from complying with the substantive takeover provisions, i.e. the Securities 
Regulation Code on Take-overs and Mergers. If the takeover involves the 
"securities" of the offeree company, the offeror needs to comply with the Code. 
This inclusion of the other methods within the ambit of the Code does not mean that 
complete neutrality of treatment of minority shareholders has been achieved. A 
scheme of arrangement, reduction of capital or conversion of securities only requires 
the approval of 75% of the members of such company to be implemented. Such a 
scheme, reduction or conversion will then be binding on the minority. They could 
therefore be expropriated by a 75% majority. On the other hand, a takeover effected 
by a normal takeover offer is treated differently. In terms of section 440K (1) (a) of 
the Companies Act 478 the offeror in an "affected transaction" may only acquire the 
shares of a dissenting minority if 90% of the members in the offeree company have 
478 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
73 
:1 accepted his offer. Thus the expropriation of minority shareholders can only take 
I ~ 
place if a 90% majority is achieved. Although Rule 29 of the Code provides for the 
} . possible exclusion of majortty votes, this Is not guaranteed and will not be done In all 
(, cases. 
The difference in treatment of minority shareholders depending on the method of 
takeover is also still prevalent in those instances where the Code is not applicable 
e.g. where the offeree company is a private company with a shareholding of less 
than R5 million or where there are less than 1 0 shareholders. It must, therefore, be 
concluded that total neutrality of treatment has not yet been achieved. 
It is, however, submitted that the solution to this problem is not in prohibiting 
takeovers by means of the scheme of arrangement, reduction of capital or 
conversion of securities methods. It must be agreed with Goldstone AJ 479 that 
these schemes play an important role in commercial life. One needs to be pragmatic 
and recognise the fact that it would be unwise to completely prohibit these 
procedures as methods to achieve takeovers. It is suggested that this lack of 
neutrality could rather be addressed as follows : 
• The inclusion of a provision within the Code and/or the Companies Act 480 
providing that if a scheme of arrangement, reduction of capital or conversion of 
securities is used to effect or results in a takeover, the required resolution 
approving such a scheme, reduction or conversion must be approved by a 90% 
majority of shareholders or class of shareholders rather than the normal75%. 481 
479 In Namex (Edms) Bpk v Kommissaris van Binnelandse lnkomste 1994 (2) SA 265 (A) at 294 
480 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
481 Unlike the position in terms of Rule 29 of the Code, this increase in the required majority will be effective in all cases and will 
not be left to the discretion of the Panel. 
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• A prohibition in the Companies Act 482 against utilising the reduction of capital or 
conversion of securities procedure to effect a takeover unless the Code will be 
applicable to such a transaction. 
• It is submitted that the scheme of arrangement procedure should remain available 
as a method of takeover even if the Code is not applicable to the transaction. 
Sound commercial reasons exist for utilising this method to take over a company 
in financial difficulty. Although the same level of protection is not available as that 
afforded by the Code, it is submitted that section 311 of the Companies Act 483 
provides sufficient protection to minority shareholders. Where the Code is not 
applicable, it is suggested that a normal special resolution would suffice and the 
90% requirement should not be applicable in these instances. 
Where the Code applies to a transaction these suggested amendments will ensure 
that a minority can not be expropriated by a smaller majority depending on the 
method chosen to effect a takeover. Where the Code is not applicable to a 
takeover, it is suggested that these other methods, except for the scheme of 
arrangement, should not be available to effect a takeover due to the insufficient 
minority shareholder protection in these instances. Where the scheme of 
arrangement procedure is used to effect a takeover, it is proposed that the 
requirements of section 311 484 be interpreted restrictively. The scheme should not 
be sanctioned by the Court if the takeover can conveniently be implemented by a 
normal takeover offer. In this regard the approach adopted in Ex Parte Mielie-Kip 485 
is endorsed. 
482 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
483 Companies Act of 61 of 1973 
484 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
485 1991 (3) SA 449 (W) 
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Although it is not satisfactory that minority shareholders could be treated differently 
in the case of an asset takeover, it is submitted that the inclusion of section 228 486 
disposals within the definition of "affected transaction" is not the solution. The 
conceptual problems inherent in such an inclusion negate this possibility. On the 
other hand, it is submitted, the present situation needs to be addressed. In this 
regard Jarvis 487 makes certain recommendations regarding possible amendments to 
section 228. 488 It is submitted that better protection to these minority shareholders 
would be afforded by an amended section 228, 489 along the lines as suggested by 
Jarvis, 490 which would provide for the following: 
(i) The incorporation of a requirement that a ''fair and reasonable" statement by 
an independent third party with suitable qualifications be provided pertaining 
to the offer (in particular whether the price offered for the assets is fair and 
reasonable) where there is a relationship, as defined in the Companies 
Act, 491 between the purchaser and the controller of the selling company; and 
(ii) the resolution in support of a transaction envisaged in section 228 492 should 
require the support of a defined majority 493 of all minority shareholders 494 in 
those circumstances where there is a relationship, as defined, between the 
purchaser and the controller of the selling company. 
486 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
487 J A K Jarvis "Protection of Minority Shareholders - Section 228 of the Companies Act • Recommendation by the Standing 
Advisory Committee on Company Law" (June 1993) De Rebus at 483 
488 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
489 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
490 J A K Jarvis "Protection of Minority Shareholders - Section 228 of the Companies Act - Recommendation by the Standing 
Advisory Committee on Company Law" (June 1993) De Rebus at483 
491 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
492 Of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
493 Preferably a simple majority of all minority shareholders should suffice. 
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As Jarvis 495 correctly points out, this proposed solution will only have the effect of 
reducing the number of potentially unhappy minority shareholders. It is, however, 
suggested that such an amendment would go some way to addressing the current 
deficiencies in the law. On policy grounds it is felt that a deviation from majority rule, 
which rule was expounded by Vermooten J, is justified under the stated 
circumstances where a relationship exists between the purchaser and the controller 
of the selling company. The required relationship between purchaser and controller 
of the selling company must be defined in the Companies Act 496 and must include 
instances where the purchaser and the controller of the selling company is the same 
person or they are acting in concert or where the controller of the selling company 
also has a controlling interest in the purchaser. Such deviation is essential to ensure 
greater neutrality of treatment of minority shareholders, irrespective of the method 
employed to effect a takeover. However, the time has not yet arrived for the 
inclusion of these transactions within the ambit of the Securities Regulation Code. 
The stated conceptual problems and a lack of resources negate such an inclusion at 
this point in the development of our securities legislation. The desirability for such 
inclusion in the future is not doubted. 
495 J A K Jarvis "Protection of Minority Shareholders - Section 228 of the Companies Act - Recommendation by the Standing 
Advisory Committee on Company Law" (June 1993) De Rebus at483 
496 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
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